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I. INTRODUCTION

T

in the international carriage

GROWTH
SIGNIFICANTgoods
HE
of containerized
by two or more different modes of

transport (multimodal transport)' has brought into sharp focus
the practical importance of implementing international rules
that regulate this particular type of transport operation. The
quest for a uniform set of international rules governing multimodal transport has been protracted, dating back to the 1960s,
yet has to date garnered modest success.' The first international
legal instrument to reach fruition was the United Nations
(U.N.) Convention on International Multimodal Transport of
Goods of May 24, 1980.' However, the Convention has not yet
entered into force and it is very unlikely that it ever will.' Approximately thirty years later, the international community produced another international instrument that attempted to
regulate international multimodal transport contracts-but this
time only to a limited extent.' These rules are the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of
I See United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of
Goods, art. 1 §§ 1-3, May 24, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 938 [hereinafter U.N. Multimodal
Transport Convention] (not yet entered into force) (defining "international multimodal transport," "multimodal transport contract," and "multimodal transport
operator"); United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of
Goods, UNITED NATIONS TREATv COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=XI-E-1&chapter-1 1&lang=en (last visited Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. TREATY COLLECTION] (documenting the
status of the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention).
2 See William Driscoll & Paul B. Larsen, The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 57 TUL. L. REv. 193 (1982) (providing a synopsis of the
attempts to achieve uniformity).
3 See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 1.
4 U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention, supra note 1 (showing that the convention has attracted only eleven out of the thirty required ratifications or other
modes of adoption for entry into force). For the reasons of failure of the convention to attract sufficient support, see Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an
International Legal Instrument: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] Secretariat,
22-26, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2003/1 (Jan. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument].
5 See G.A. Res. 63/122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/122 (Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter
Rotterdam Rules].
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Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Rotterdam Rules), adopted by
the U.N. Assembly in December 2008.6 The Rotterdam Rules do
not, however, qualify as a fully-fledged multimodal transport regime. They are designed to apply only to a limited range of multimodal transport operations, such as contracts for the carriage
of goods by combination of sea and any other transport mode,
as defined in Article 1.1 (referred to as "wet multimodal transport").' The fate of the Rotterdam Rules is also uncertain, as
they still require eighteen ratifications to enter into force.'
The failure of the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention to
attract sufficient support and the doubtful future of the Rotterdam Rules leave open the issue of the applicable liability rules in
cases of cargo loss, damage, or delay in delivery occurring in the
course of multimodal transport operations. What has, however,
complicated matters is that the gap left by the absence of internationally-accepted rules on transnational multimodal transport
has been filled over the years by a rather complex and fragmented legal framework.' The rules applicable to the liability of
a multimodal transport operator (MTO) are embodied in a mosaic of international conventions on unimodal transport (which
also extend to other modes of transport),1o regional and subregional agreements on multimodal carriage of goods," and national laws governing multimodal transport, as well as different

Id.
Id. art. 1 § 1.
8 Id. art. 94 § 1 (stating the requirement of twenty ratifications or other modes
of adoption for entry into force); Status: 2008-United Nations Convention on Contracts for the InternationalCarriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea-the "Rotterdam
Rules", U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw, http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport-goods/rotterdam status.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2012) (documenting the status of the Rotterdam Rules in that only
two states, Spain and Togo, have ratified them so far).
9 See discussion infra Part III.
6
7

10 See id.

11See, e.g., Asociacion Latinoamericana de Intergracion [Latin American Integration Association] [ALADI] Agreement on International Multimodal Transport, Nov. 8, 1996, http://www.aladi.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter
ALADI Agreement]; Association of Southeastern Nations Framework Agreement
on Multimodal Transport, Nov. 17, 2005, http://aseansec.org/17877.htm (last
visited Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter ASEAN Framework Agreement]. See also Implementation of Multimodal Transport Rules: Report Prepared by the UNCTAD
Secretariat, UNCTAD Secretariat, 1 47-122, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/
2 (June 25, 2001) [hereinafter Implementation of Multimodal Transport Rules]
(for reference to other regional and subregional agreements).
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aspects of the transport operations.'213 Moreover, MTO liability
is often governed by standard contract terms, such as the ICC/
UNCTAD Rules," which have been incorporated in widely used
multimodal transport documents like the MULTIDOC 95 and
the FIATA FBL 1992.15 Variety is not, however, the only complicating factor that renders the current legal framework far from
ideal. It is also the type of the liability scheme the multimodal
transport rules adopt-namely the network'" or modified network liability scheme"-that creates unpredictability and legal
uncertainty by, inter alia, turning the identification of the applicable liability regime and/or the limitation of liability rules into

12 See, e.g., Transportrechtsreformgesetz [TRG] [German Transport Law Reform Act],June 22, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATr [BGB] at 25, art. 1, §§ 452-452(d),
amendingJune 22, 1998, BGB at 1, art. 3, § 4100-1 (Ger.) [hereinafter German
Transport Law Reform Act]; Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW], art. 8, §§ 40-43 (Neth.);
Lei No. 9.61 de 19 de Feveiro de 1998, D.O.U., Feveiro 1998 (Braz.); see also Rolf
Herber, The German Legislation on Multimodal Transport: Why Did It Come True and
HasIt Worked Out Well?, in FUTURE LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORT LAw 23 (Johan Schelin ed., 2008).
15 See, e.g., Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445-46 (1893), reprinted in 46 U.S.C. § 30701-07
(2006) (previously codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-96) [hereinafter Harter
Act]; German Transport Law Reform Act, supra note 12, § 475 (liability of warehouse keepers).
14 UNCTAD, UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents,
I.C.C. Pub. 298 (Jan. 7, 1992) [hereinafter UNCTAD/ICC Rules] (following to a
certain extent the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention). Other standard
terms include the General Conditions of the Union Internationale des Socidt6s
de Transport Comdin6 Rail-Route [International Union of Combined Rail and
Road Transport Companies] (UIRR), July 1, 1999; NSAB 2000: General Conditions of Nordiskt Speditor F6rbond [Nordic Association of Freight Forwarders],
June 1, 1998. See also DAVID A. GLAss, FREIGHT FORWARDING AND MULTIMODAL
TRANSPORT CONTRACTS [ 3C.6 (2004) (providing a comprehensive discussion of
the UNCTAD/ICC Rules) and NSAB 2000: THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE
NORDIc ASSOCIATION OF FREIGHT FORWARDERS: COMMENTARY By JAN RAMBERG
(2001) (for an analysis of NSAB 2000).
15 MULTIDOC 95, The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO);
FIATA [International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations] Multimodal
Transport Bill of Lading 1992 [hereinafter FIATA FBL 1992].
16 See, e.g., Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods
by Road, art. 2 § 1, May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 189, as amended by Protocol to
the Convention for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, July 7, 1978,
1208 U.N.T.S. 427 [hereinafter CMR]; see alsoJAN RAMBERG, THE LAw OF TRANSPORT OPERATORS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 176-79 (Norstedts Juridik ed., 2005).
17 See, e.g., German Transport Law Reform Act, supra note 12, § 452(a); UNTAD/ICC Rules, supra note 14, art. 6 § 4; ALADI Agreement, supra note 11, art.
15; see RALPH DE WIT, MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT 11 2.145-2.169 (1995) (for a detailed discussion of the different liability systems).
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a fact-specific inquiry for each case,"' leading to the application
of the various liability schemes prescribed in the unimodal transport conventions.19 To further complicate matters, what rules
apply depends not only on the localization of cargo loss, but also
on local jurisprudence, especially regarding the particular tribunal's application of unimodal transport rules to multimodal
transport operations, as well as its jurisprudence on their scope
of application.2 0 To that, one should also add the unforeseeability and uncertainty associated with the terms of existing multimodal transport regimes per se, specifically relating to their
diverse rules on the default limits of liability and other core matters like documentation or time bars.2 1 It thus comes as no surprise that the existing multimodal transport regime has been
openly criticised by government representatives and industry
stakeholders as unsatisfactory and uneconomic, and even as impeding the promotion of international trade. 2
As had been expected, this longstanding legal conundrum
has finally attracted the international community's regulatory attention. The harmonization of international multimodal transport rules has occupied the agenda of several multilateral
organizations, leading to proposals for a new (international or
regional) regime on multimodal transport. For instance, in
1998, the Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations'
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) commissioned a
group of experts to propose an international legal instrument
on multimodal transport.2 3 The expert group called for a fresh
18 See, e.g., Finagra v. O.T. Africa Line, [1998] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 622 (Q.B.) 626
(Eng.).
19 See The UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, and
the Other Transport Conventions, Comparative Tables-Note by the Secretariat
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group III on Transport Law, 11th Sess., March 24-Apr. 4, 2003, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.27
(Dec. 30, 2002) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Comparative Tables of the Transport
Convention].
20 See further discussion infra Part III.
21 See Implementation of Multimodal Transport Rules-Comparative TableReport Prepared by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/
2/Add.1 (Oct. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Implementation of Multimodal Transport
Rules Comparative Table].
22 See, e.g., Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument, supra note 4,
14, 21, 90.
23 See Report of the Working Party on Combined Transport on its 30th Session,
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Econ. Comm'n for Eur. [UNECE], Inland Transport Comm., Working Party on Combined Transport, 11 37-44, 30th
Sess., Sept. 7-8, 1998, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.24/81 (Oct. 28, 1998) [hereinafter
UNECE Report (Oct. 28, 1998)].
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attempt to produce mandatory international legislation on multimodal transport liability based on existing unimodal liability
regimes. 24 It therefore recommended adopting a modified network system of liability, including default rules for unlocalized
damages similar to the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR).5 In addition,
the European Commission has been working on the regulation
of multimodal transport carrier liability in the European Union
since the 1990s as the advance of intermodal freight transport
forms part of the wider project on the development of a Common European Transport Policy (CTP)."2 This project has generated so far three proposals, which are diametrically opposed
to the UNECE's proposal, as they each support adopting different versions of the uniform liability system. 27
This article aims to contribute to the ongoing debate over the
possibility of implementing a uniform international multimodal
transport regime. It first focuses on the need for harmonizing
current international multimodal transport regimes and explores ways to maximize the prospects of new regime's global
24 Id.
14; see Possibilities for Reconciliation and Harmonization of Civil Liability Regimes Governing Combined Transport, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Econ. Comm'n for Eur. (UNECE), Inland Transport Comm., Working Party on Combined Transport, 1 22, 29, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.24/1999/2
(Nov. 12, 1999) [hereinafter UNECE Report (Nov. 12, 1999)].
25 Possibilities for Reconciliation and Harmonization of Civil Liability Regimes
Governing Combined Transport, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Econ.
Comm'n for Eur. [UNECE], Inland Transport Comm., Working Party on Combined Transport, 31st Sess., Apr. 12-13, 1999, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.24/1999/2
(Jan. 19, 1999) [hereinafter UNECE Report (Jan. 19, 1999)].
26 See also EUR. CMTY. COMM'N, WHITE PAPER ON THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY: A GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF
A COMMUNITY FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY (1993).
27 R. ASARIOTIS ET AL., INTERMODAL TRANSPORT AND CARRIER LIABILITY (Eur.
Comm'n ed., 1999); M.A. CLARKE ET AL., INTEGRATED SERVICES IN THE INTERMODAL CHAIN (ISIC)-FINAL REPORT TASK B: INTERMODAL LIABILTY AND DocUMENTATION (2005) [hereinafter CLARKE, ISIC FINAL REPORT (2005)]; Final
Report: Study on the Details and Added Value of Establishing a (Optional) Single Transport (Electronic) Document for All Carriage of Goods, Irrespective of
Mode, As Well As a Standard Liability Clause (Voluntary Liability Regime), with
Regard to Their Ability to Facilitate Multimodal Freight Transport and Enhance
the Framework Offered by Multimodal Waybills and or Multimodal Manifests, at
95, TREN/CC/01-2005/LOT1 /LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES [hereinafter
European Commission 2009 Report on Multimodal Transport]. See Ellen EfestolWilhelmsson, EU Intermodal Transport and CarrierLiability - Content and Context,
2007 SCANDINAVIAN INST. MAR. LAw Y.B. (Univ. of Oslo) 133, 135-38 (discussing
the European initiatives); Ellen Efestol-Wilhelmsson, The Rotterdam Rules in a Eurapean Multimodal Context, 16J. INT'L MAR. L. 274, 275-80 (2010).
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acceptance. To that end, it seeks to identify common denominators in current proposals supporting new rules with a view to
delineating the objectives of the new international multimodal
transport regime. While mapping these aims, this article emphasizes the importance of overcoming current deficiencies in existing multimodal transport rules and concludes that a new
regime will have decidedly better prospects than the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention if, in addition to securing the
transport industry's support, it promotes predictability, legal
certainty, and cost-effective administration of multimodal transport operations. It next explores the extent to which the uniform liability scheme, which has not so far been tested in
practice, could attain its proposed aims. The article therefore
tests the uniform liability scheme against the objectives elaborated above and concludes that it certainly meets the first objective, predictability of the applicable liability rules, because the
foreseeability of laws is inherent in the uniform liability system.
Whether the uniform liability scheme meets the other two objectives, legal certainty and cost-effectiveness, is less certain, as this
depends on the particular rules to be included and whether
they would be sufficient to promote them.
II. THE HARMONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT LIABILITY RULES: MAPPING
OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL REGIME ON
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
The development of smooth, economic, and efficient multimodal transport services, which will also further international
trade, may be promoted not only by modernizing infrastructure
and equipment for moving goods, but also by implementing
uniform rules on international multimodal transport. So far,
this has not been achieved because, as discussed above, transnational multimodal transport operations are regulated by complex and fragmented legal rules that lead to increased litigation
and insurance costs." The need to harmonize existing international multimodal transport laws has thus become imperative as
it is believed that the current rules-and, more importantly,

See, e.g., UNECE Report (Jan. 19, 1999), supra note 25, 1 11; Multimodal
Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument, supra note 4, 11
14, 21.
28

76

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[78

their deficiencies-stand as an impediment to the development
of freight intermodalism worldwide."
It appears that the idea of harmonizing disparate international multimodal transport regimes has now matured, thereby
enhancing the prospects for success of any project on multimodal transport law. This much is evident from a questionnaire conducted by UNCTAD beginning in 2002 that revealed
that reform of the current rules on international multimodal
transport would have the clear support of the international
transport community.30 Undoubtedly, such declared support is a
good starting point, but it will not suffice. The success (or otherwise) of an international multimodal transport instrument depends heavily on negotiation outcomes and, in particular, on
whether the new regime's final text will receive the same degree
of widespread acceptance by the international transport community. In fact, this will be one of the drafter's major challenges,
especially in light of the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention's failure to achieve uniformity." If, therefore, the endorsement and application of a uniform law is to be attractive to
potential parties, the law must ensure that it will accommodate
the transport industry's needs. This will certainly require new
rules to overcome the deficiencies of the current rules, which
have been openly criticized by governments and the transport
industry. 2 To that end, careful consideration should be given to
the objectives of the current international multimodal transport
rules because these will not only form the basis for drafting a
2
See, e.g., UNECE Report (Nov. 12, 1999), supra note 24, 1 11. But see Reconciliation and Harmonization of Civil Liability Regimes in Intermodal Transport,
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Econ. Comm'n for Eur. [UNECE], Inland Transport Comm., Joint ECMT/UNECE Working Party/Group on Intermodal Transport and Logistics, 46th Sess., Apr. 3-4, 2006 (Sept. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter UNECE Report (Sept. 7, 2006)] (regarding the opposition to the
harmonization of the international multimodal transport rules expressed by
FIATA and CLECAT (Comit6 de Liaison Europ6en des Commissionaires et Auxiliaires de Transport du March6 Commun)).
3o See Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument, supra note 4, 1 39 ("virtually all respondents (98%) indicated that they
would support any concerted efforts towards the development of a new international instrument").
31 U.N. TmiuFrv COLLECTION, supra note 1. See also supra note 4 (for the reasons
the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention failed to attract sufficient ratifications to enter into force).
32 See Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument, supra note 4, 11 14, 21, 90.
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new instrument, they will also delineate the means of addressing
existing problems in the legal framework.
Judging by the proposals put forward so far," it should not be
difficult to reach a consensus regarding the objectives that a new
international multimodal transport conventions should ideally
meet in establishing a new set of rules. In particular, first of all,
it transpires from all four proposals that the new rules must be
both predictable and certain.3 1 Undoubtedly, one of the benefits of a new regime that promotes predictability is the reduction
of legal risk and the subsequent increase in value of carriage
transactions.35 That is, predictability allows parties to the multimodal contract of carriage to form clear legal commitments
with predictable consequences. 6 But even then, one should not
lose sight of the fact that foreseeability and legal certainty will
only be achieved if the new rules provide for their interrelationship with existing unimodal transport international conventions. If not, there may be a risk of overlapping rules which
could result in conflicting decisions among jurisdictions.3 8 In addition, to be successful the new regime should also promote
cost-effective administration of multimodal transport operations.39 This requires drafting rules that will reduce or, if possible, eliminate the friction costs relating to litigation and
insurance premiums the transport industry is currently
incurring. 40
Surprisingly, unlike the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention and the Rotterdam Rules, no proposal refers to the promotion of equality in international trade, and in particular to the
See supra notes 24, 25, 29.
UNECE Report (Nov. 12, 1999), supra note 24, 19; ASARIOTIS ET AL., Suffa
note 27, at 10, 24; CLARKE ET AL., supra note 27, at 9, 19; European Commission
2009 Report on Multimodal Transport, supra note 27, at 187. It is also worthy to
note that the promotion of the predictability and legal certainty are also two of
the objectives of the Rotterdam Rules. See Rotterdam Rules (Preamble), supra
note 5.
3 See generally Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
InternationalCommercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 746 (1999) (defining "legal
risk" as the concept of unpredictable rules applying to a business relationship).
36 Id.
3 See discussion infra Part III.
38 See, e.g., ASARIOTIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 24, 30; see also Rotterdam Rules,
supra note 5, arts. 26, 82 (the pertinent conflicts provision).
s9 UNECE Report (Nov. 12, 1999), supra note 25, 1 19; ASARIOTIS ET AL., supra
note 27, at 10, 24.
40 See, e.g., Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument, supra note 4,
14, 21 (questionnaire responses).
33
3
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maintenance of a fair balance of interests between developed
and developing countries, a factor that is deemed essential for
the promotion of international trade.4 1 One may assume that
equality can be achieved, at least to an extent, if international
multimodal transport rules are predictable, certain, and cost effective. This assumption is based on the idea that implementing
predictable and certain rules will reduce transaction costs and
thus promote equitable access to, and participation in, international markets for developing countries, which are presently disadvantaged due to the high friction costs associated with
international multimodal transport.4 2 Setting forth predictable
and certain rules will therefore contribute to the equal development of trade, but this is certainly not the only means of attaining equality. It may also be argued that the promotion of equity
in international trade may be achieved by provisions that strike a
fair balance between the interests of MTOs and shippers.4 3 This
is, however, just one side of the coin. One may counter-argue
that express references to equality in preambles of international
trade conventions like the U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention and the Rotterdam Rules exist solely for political correctness. So, if it is included in the new multimodal transport
instrument, equality may serve that same perfunctory purpose,
and it may therefore not really matter whether equality is an
express objective.
Moreover, the new convention must be successful in securing
the transport industry's blessing4 4 to render acceptance by a significant number of trading nations (including the most important ones) a realistic prospect. If not, the international
community will have expended significant energy in producing
yet another convention never to be implemented, just like the
1 See U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention (Preamble), supranote 1, at 938;
Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5.
42 Possibilities for Reconciliation and Harmonization of Civil Liability Regimes
Governing Combined Transport, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Econ.
Comm'n for Eur. [UNECE], Inland Transport Comm., Working Party on Com14, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.24/
bined Transport, 34th Sess., Sept. 4-6, 2000,
2000/3 (Jul. 3, 2000) [hereinafter UNECE Report (July 3, 2000)] (Report of two
expert group meetings ("hearings") on civil liability regimes for multimodal
transport); Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal In14.
strument, supra note 4,
43 See Theodora Nikaki & Baris Soyer, A New InternationalRegime for Carriage of
Goods by Sea: Contemporary, Certain, Inclusive, and Efficient, orJust Another One for the
Shelves? 30 BERKELEY J. INT. L. 302, 329 (2012) (writing in the context of the
Rotterdam Rules).
44 ASARIOTIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 10, 24.
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UN Multimodal Transport Convention." Or even worse, if the
new convention gains only the minimum required ratifications
for entry into force, there is the risk of further fragmentation of
international multimodal transport laws, which will obviously
complicate matters even more. Gaining widespread acceptance
is indeed the most difficult task, as it requires consultation not
only with government delegates, but also with representatives of
all transport modes and other interests involved in multimodal
transport operations. 6 It also requires that these groups will at
least reach a compromise on the core provisions of a new convention, not excepting the rules governing liability and limitation of liability. This will be challenging given the divergent
bases and limits of liability rules provided for in existing
unimodal transport conventions. 47 It is also inevitable that representatives of each mode of transport will insist upon adopting
the liability systems already applicable to their particular mode,
as they are familiar with them and they have established their
entire operations on the basis of these rules (i.e., transport documents, etc.). As expected, even before the initiation of negotiations, some stakeholders have expressed -their preference for
extending the international regime currently applicable to their
mode of transport to all or some types of multimodal
transport.18
So far, so good. Drafting adequate objectives alone, however,
will be futile if they are not also combined with rules that meet
these, objectives and thus deal with-at least most of the-difficulties of current multimodal transport regimes. This leads to
the issue of whether and to what extent the uniform liability
scheme, on which this article focuses, may successfully attain the
aims set above in order to become the basis for the new interna45 See U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention, supra note 1; Rotterdam Rules,
supra note 5.
46 Such as MTOs, freight forwarders, insurance companies, and cargo interests. Consultation with sea, road, and raid carriers; freight forwarders; and insurance companies, alongside shippers, took place, for instance, in the course of the
negotiation of the Rotterdam Rules. See further, the traveaux preparatoiresto
those rules, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working-groups/3Transport.html#9thsession.
47 See UNCITRAL Comparative Tables of the Transport Conventions, supra
note 19; see also Malcolm A. Clarke, A Way with Words: Some Obstacles to Unifnn
Transport Law, 3 UNIF. L. REv. 351 (1998) (discussing the differences between the
liability rules on the international unimodal transport conventions).
48 See, e.g., Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an International Legal Instrument, supra note 4, 1 34-35; European Commission 2009 Report on Multimodal Transport, supra note 27, at 179.
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tional multimodal transport regime. This issue will be further
considered in Part III.
III.
A.

OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT REGIME

PREDICTABILITY OF MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT LAWS AND
LEGAL CERTAINTY

1. Predictabilityof Multimodal Transport Laws and the Uniform
Liability System
Restoring the long-lost predictability and legal certainty of the
current multimodal transport framework will unquestionably be
one of the main objectives of a new international multimodal
transport instrument. In fact, achieving this aim is not only an
end in itself, but is also a means of achieving the other two
objectives. A predictable and legally certain regime may reduce
friction costs and may therefore promote international trade. In
turn, a cost-effective regime will have enhanced prospects of acceptance by the transport industry and ratification by a greater
number of trading nations.
Starting with predictability of the applicable laws to multimodal transport operations, there is no doubt that adoption of
a uniform liability system, which provides for the same liability
rules throughout a multimodal transport operation, would promote this objective. The reason is that parties to a multimodal
contract of carriage would know the "rules of the game" from
the outset-e.g., the independent rules applicable to cargo loss,
irrespective of transport leg-and could therefore enter clear
legal commitments with foreseeable consequences." In addition, being seamless and transparent, a uniform liability system
would avoid factual inquiries related to localization of cargo loss
and would avoid some legal risks stemming from the identification of the applicable liability and/or limitation of liability rules,
which are inherent in both modified and network liability systems. Adopting a uniform liability system would thus eliminate
unnecessary litigation, associated with the pertinent factual and
legal inquiries, thus avoiding costs stemming from claims han4

See, e.g.,

REPORT,

ASARIOTIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 30; CLARKE ET AL., ISIC FINAL
supra note 27, at 9. See generally Stephan, supra note 35, at 746-48.
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dling and litigation, and thereby leading to a proportionate decrease in (at least) cargo insurance premiums.5 o
2.

Legal Certainty and Multimodal Transport Laws: Is the Uniform
Liability Scheme the Panaceafor Legal Ambiguity?

Implementing predictable rules on multimodal transport
alone will not be sufficient for developing sustainable and effective multimodal transportation services. As discussed above, to
be successful a uniform liability system must also promote legal
certainty, meaning that the rules embodied in the system must
be as clear and certain as is possible. If not, they will inevitably
create unnecessary interpretive legal proceedings. Therefore, to
achieve legal certainty, the drafters of a uniform liability scheme
must engage in the strenuous task of addressing the uncertainty
associated with the current legal framework and the uniform liability system per se, with a view toward adopting solutions that
can eliminate or reduce to the greatest possibly extent the pertinent ambiguities.
When evaluating the causes of legal ambiguity associated with
current international multimodal transport rules, one could easily conclude that one of the most difficult and controversial issues brought before national courts is the direct applicability of
unimodal transport treaties to multimodal transport operations
involving "mode-to mode" carriage. 5 ' In fact, all of the controversial cases have focused on applying the CMR 2 and very few
50 See infra Part III (discussion regarding the interrelationship between litigation costs and the calculation of the premium).
51 Compare Princes Buitoni v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft [1991] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 383 (Eng.) (focusing.on the issue of the application of the CMR to the road
leg of a multimodal transport operation, where the CMR applied as a matter of
contract), with CMR, supra note 16, art. 2 § 1.
52 This is just one of the issues that has arisen over the applicability of the
international conventions to international unimodal transport. Another issue
that has also led to diverging opinions is whether an international transport convention would apply to a multimodal transport operation if the overall multimodal operation is international but not the particular transport leg. Compare
Rechtbank [R.R.] [ordinary court of first instance] Rotterdam 24 januari 1992,
S&S 1993, 89 m.nt. (Neth.) (ruling in favor of the applicability of the CMR to the
road domestic leg (Cairo-Alexandria) of an international road-sea-road transport
operation (Cairo (Egypt)-Geleen (The Netherlands)), with Oberlandesgericht
[OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Dusseldorf] June 16, 2004 (I-18U 237/03)
(Ger.) (reaching the opposite conclusion). See also Roland Loewe, Commentary on
the Convention of 19 May 1956 on the Contractfor the InternationalCarriageof Goods by
Road (CMR), (1976) EUR. TRANSP. L. 311, 327; Anthony Diamond, Legal Aspects of
the Convention, in PAPERS OF A ONE DAY SEMINAR Cl, C2 (Southampton Univ.,
Sept. 12, 1980) (both supporting the second option).
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have dealt with the Hague regimes-the Hague Rules and the
Hague-Visby Rules." What may be inferred from most cases,
however, is that most legal uncertainty comes from the definition of the contract of carriage provided in the CMR and the
Hague regimes, because that definition largely assumes that
unimodal transport sits ill with transport by several means. It is
also worth mentioning that the Hamburg Rules, as well as the
Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, have taken a different approach on this matter by having a separate provision clarifying
that their rules apply to unimodal legs that form part of a multimodal journey." Although it seems that this approach has significantly reduced disputes because there are very few reported
cases dealing with this issue66-which have so far ruled for the
applicability of the Warsaw/Montreal Conventions to multimodal legs of multimodal journeys-one should not underestimate the possibility of diverging decisions on the matter. It has
been argued, for instance, that a contract of carriage by air with
an option to carry by other modes does not meet the preconditions of Article 38 of the Montreal Convention." Supporters of
this view justify it on the basis that such a contract qualifies as a
multimodal carriage contract rather than a "contract of carriage

53 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 223, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Hague
Rules]; Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S. 121
(amending the Hague Rules); Protocol Amending the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Dec. 21,
1979, 1412 U.N.T.S. 146 (amending the Hague Rules) [hereinafter Hague-Visby
Rules].
54 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea art. 1 § 6, Mar.
31, 1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Hamburg Rules]; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air art. 38, May 28, 1999,
2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air art. 31 § 1, Oct.
12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
55 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 347 F.3d 448, 458 (2d Cir.
2003) (citing with approval GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT: THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 249-56 (1977));
Hojesteret [H.D.] [Supreme Court of Denmark] 23 april 2008 (Nos. 120/2005
and 138/2005), U.2008.1638H (The Salmon Roe) (obiter) (Den.).
56 Vibe Ulfbeck, The Air/Road Combination in Recent European Case Law, 33
TRANSPR 370, 372 (2010). See also David C. Jackson, Conflict of Conventions, in PAPERS OF A ONE DAY SEMINAR GI, G5 (Southampton Univ., Sept. 12, 1980)
(counter-argument regarding the application of the Warsaw Convention to the
unimodal legs of multimodal transport).

2013]

MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT LAW

83

of goods by air," which is required for applying the Montreal
convention to the air leg of a multimodal transport operation."
Regarding the CMR, judicial opinions vary significantly, with
the courts of England and Wales taking a "pro-CMR" approach
based on a broad definition of the "contract of carriage by
road."5 Hence, according to English courts, the CMR would apply to the road leg of a multimodal transport operation where
the contract of carriage permits for the carriage of goods by
road and the goods are actually carried by road, even if they are
not exclusively or predominantly carried by road.59 At the other
end of the spectrum one will find the German and Dutch
courts. 6 0 It was, however, as late as 2008 that the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) changed its long-standing position
and ruled for the first time against applying the CMR to multimodal transport. The BGH based its judgment on a very literal
interpretation of the phrase "Eontract of carriage by road," taking the view that the contract for the carriage of goods by road
means carriage solely by road.6' The court reinforced its position by construing Article 2 as defining the scope of multimodal
transport to which the CMR applies and concluded that the
CMR applies only to multimodal transport operations falling
57 Ulfbeck, supra note 55; Jackson, supra note 55. Contra H.D. 23 april 2008
(Nos. 120/2005 and 138/2005), U.2008.1638H (The Salmon Roe) (obiter)
(Den.).
58 Quantum Corp. v. Plane Trucking, Ltd. [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 25 (C.A.)
30-31 (Eng.). The ruling in Quantum has been supported by leading academics,
such as Professor Malcolm Clarke. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY
ROAD: CMR
13, 18 (Malcolm A. Clarke ed., 5th ed. 2009); Malcolm A. Clarke,
Carrier'sLiability in Cross-BorderAir Cargo Substitute Transportation,28 TRANSPR 182,
184 (2005). But see Ingo Koller, Quantum Corporation Inc. v. Plane Trucking
Limited und die Anwendbarkeit der CMR auf die Befdrderung mit Verschiedenartigen
Transportmitteln, 26 TRANSPR 45 (2003).
59 Quantum, [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 30.
60 Bundesgerichshof [BGH] [Federal Court ofJustice] Jul. 17, 2003 (1 ZR 181/
05), (2009) EUR. TRANSP. L. [ETL] 196 (Ger.); Hof den Haag [HDH] [ordinary
court of appeal] 22 juni 2010, S&S 2010, 104 m.nt. Z.V.D. (Godafoss) (Neth.),
rev'g RR Rotterdam 11 april 2007, S&S 2009, 55 m.nt. (Godafoss) (Neth.). It
should be noted, however, that the BGH distinguished the case at issue from the
previous German cases. The court held that its ruling was not in contradiction
with the previous German cases, as in none of the previous cases had the court
addressed the issue of the direct applicability of the CMR to multimodal contracts of carriage because in all of them, German law applied to the carriage
contract. (2009) EUR. TRANsp. L. at 202; see also Peter Laurijssen, Quantum Corporation Inc. v. Plane Trucking Ltd. Revisited by German Supreme Court: Consideration on
the German FederalHigh Court'sDecision of 1 7July 2008, (2009) EUR. TRANsp. L. 143,
145 (criticizing the BGH on that point).
61 (2009) EUR. TRANSP. L. at 200-01.
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into the scope of Article 2.62 Lastly, the court reasoned that it
transpires from the Protocol of Signature that the drafters of the
CMR did not intend to extend its scope to multimodal transport
operations because it is stated in the protocol that they also intended to prepare a separate instrument on international multimodal transport." The BGH's reasoning was followed by the
Dutch Court of Appeals in 2010, and then by the Supreme
Court of The Netherlands, in the case of Godafoss.64
Also, somewhere between the English and German courts, the
Belgian Cour de Cassation decided that the CMR does apply to
a contract of carriage-but only if the contractual agreement
expressly provides for carriage by road, or, where the contract
leaves the means of transport open, if it can be inferred from
the circumstances that the parties intended goods to be carried
by road."5 It can, however, be deduced from the facts of the case
that the actual carriage of goods by road by itself does not suffice because the parties' intent to carry goods by road is what
triggers the CMR.6 6 Thus, unlike the courts in England and
Wales," the Belgian courts may not hold the CMR applicable to
combined transport contracts for unspecified transport performed partly by road (mode to mode) if the surrounding circumstances do not indicate that the parties had envisaged road
carriage. This approach may, however, lead to evidentiary inquiries regarding the intent of the parties, especially in cases
62

Id. at 201.

63 Id.
64 HDH, 22juni 2010, S&S 2010, 104 m.nt.J.M.R. (Godafoss) (Neth.), rev'gRR
Rotterdam 11 april 2007, S&S 2009, 55 m.nt. Z.V.D. (Godafoss) (Neth.), upheld by
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme court of the Netherlands] 1 juni
2012, NJ 2012, 516 m.mt. K.F.H. (Godafoss) (Neth.). This was expected given
that the pre-2008 position of the German courts had formed the basis for the
decisions of other European courts, including those of England and Wales. See,
e.g., BGH June 24, 1987 (I ZR 127/85), 10 TRANsPR 447 (1987) (Ger.); Quantum
[2002] Lloyd's Rep. at 36-37.
65 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court forjudicial matters] Nov. 8, 2004,
(2006) EUR. TRANsp. L. 228 (Belg.) (TNT Express Belgium v. Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company Europe Ltd.); see also Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Anvers, Jan. 30, 2012 (Fr.) (stating that if the contract of carriage leaves the
means open, the contract will be qualified as one of carriage by road for the
purposes of the CMR only if the parties had in fact agreed to carry the goods by
road).
66 See id.
67 Quantum [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 30-31 (holding that the CMR applies to
contracts that leave open the means of transport, "either entirely or as between a
number of possibilities at least one of them being carriage by road") (emphasis
added).
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where there is evidence that the cargo interests were engaged in
discussions over the cost implications and advantages of different modes of transport."
The applicability of the CMR to separate road legs of multimodal journeys has also been upheld or rejected by other national courts on grounds not associated with the interpretation
of "contract of carriage of goods by road." For example, a U.S.
court of appeals adopted a pro-CMR stance by applying the network liability system." Also, in two cases in which carriage by
road options were included in air waybills, both the French Tribunal de Commerce and the Danish Supreme Court took a dif7 o and looked at the overall
ferent view than Quantum
characterization of the contract (i.e., that the contract was an air
waybill)." Therefore, both courts applied the relevant air convention to the entire transport operation, notwithstanding the
actual performance of the land segment by road.
Although these cases center on the direct applicability of the
CMR to multimodal transport operations, possibly because road
haulage is the most popular "connecting" mode of transport,
one should not underestimate the possibility that disputes may
arise over applying the Convention Concerning International
Carriage of Goods by Rail and the Uniform Rules Concerning
the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail (collec68 See Institutional & Technological Changes in Transport/Logistics Field,
UNCTAD Secretariat, 1 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/TIB/3 (Mar. 4, 1999) (reporting that shippers "today are less interested in specifying the mode of transport than in the past. Rather, they are going to ask the service provider to help
analyse the service-cost trade-offs of the different modes and provide the combination that is most cost-effective as part of an overall distribution pattern.").
69 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas Containers Lines (UK) Ltd., 230
F.3d 549, 558-59 (2d Cir. 2000), vacatingHartford Fire Ins. Co. v. M/V "OOCL
BRAVERY," 79 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Qo
Quantum [2002] 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. at 40 (rejecting the overall characterization of the contract argument as it "would open up a prospect of metaphysical
arguments about the essence of a multimodal contract."). It is also noteworthy
that the overall characterization of the contract (Gesamtbetrachtung) approach
has also been rejected by both the German and the Australian courts. See BGH
June 24, 1987 (1 ZR 127/85), 10 TRANSPR 447 (1987) (Ger.); Siemens Ltd. v. Schenker Int'1 (Australia)Pty Ltd. [2002] NSWCA 172 (Austl.), affd by [2004] HCA 11
(Austl.).
71 Tribunal de Commerce [Trib. de Comm.] [Commercial court] de Bobigny,
24 Novembre 1995, Bulletin des transports et de la logistique 1996, 38 (Fr.), available at http://www.idit.asso.fr/_private/moteur-Cmr/jurisprudence/fiche.php?
num=0; H.D. 23 april 2008 (Nos. 120/2005 & 138/2005), U.2008.1638H (The
Salmon Roe) (Den.).
72 Id. See criticism of the Danish case in Ulfbeck, supra note 55, at 375.
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tively, COTIF-CIM 1999)71 or the Budapest Convention on the
Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Inland Waterway
(CMNI) 74 to segments of multimodal operations performed by
rail or inland waterways, respectively. This is because the material scope of both conventions, as defined in their respective definitions of the "contract for the carriage of goods,"7 5 is very
similar to that of the CMR, which, as discussed above, has been
the crux of extensive litigation. To this, one should add the COTIF-CIM 1999's and the CMNI's provisions on special cases of
multimodal transport76 that national courts may interpret as restricting their application to particular combined transport operations, just as with Article 2, Section 1, of the CMR.77 It is thus
possible that the same division of opinion will be repeated regarding the applicability of COTIF-CIM 1999 and the CMNI because courts tend to extend their ratio decidendi by analogy to
similar situations. What is unfortunate, however, is that the risk
of such disputes could have been easily avoided when the international transport conventions were drafted and modified. The
CMNI was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference in 2000,
while both the CMR and the COTIF-CIM were modified by protocols in 2008 and 1999 respectively, 9 long after the first dis-

73 Convention Concerning International Carriage of Goods by Rail (COTIF),
app. B, International Rail Transport Committee (CIT); Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM), May 9, 1980
(as amended June 3, 1999) [collectively, hereinafter COTIF-CIM 1999].
74 Budapest Convention on the Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Inland
Waterway, Apr. 1, 2005, International Rail Transport Committee (CIT) [hereinafter CMNI].
75 CMNI, supra note 73, art. 1 § 1; COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note 72, art. 1 § 1.
76 CMNI, supra note 73, art. 2 § 2; COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note 72,
arts. 1 § 4,
38.
77 BGH July 7, 2008 (I ZR 181/05), (2009) EUR. TRANSP. L. 196 (Ger.); HDH
22juni 2010, S&S 2010, 104 m.nt. (Godafoss) (Neth.).
78 CMNI was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference Organized Jointly by the
Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, the Danube Commission
and UN/ECE, held in Budapest from September 25 to October 3, 2000. CMNI,
supra note 73.
79 Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Contract for the International
Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) concerning the Electronic Consignment
Note, Geneva, February 20, 2008 (entered into force June 5, 2011); Protocol of 3
June 1999 for the Modification of the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF), May 9, 1980 (1999 Protocol) (entered into force July 1,
2006).
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putes arose over the application of CMR to the road legs of
combined transport."o
It is also surprising that, despite the great volume of cargo
transported by sea, there are very few reported cases on the direct applicability of the Hague regimes to sea legs of multimodal
transport operations. Even so, national courts have nevertheless
split over the matter, causing further uncertainty. On one hand,
Australian and Dutch courts have issued judgments applying the
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules to sea carriage that formed part of
a multimodal transport operation." It was, however, only the
Australian court that took the issue further and clarified that the
"multimodal bill of lading," which purports to cover both sea
and land transport, is a bill of lading within the meaning of the
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. 2 On the other hand, without
much elaboration, Italian and English courts have held that the
Hague-Visby Rules do not apply to contracts of carriage contained or evidenced in multimodal transport documents." Academics have, though, shed more light on the matter, centering
their debate on whether a multimodal bill of lading is "a bill of
lading or a similar document of title, in so far as such document
relates to the carriage of goods by sea."8 4 It is the prevailing view
among academics in the United Kingdom that a multimodal
transport document meets the requirements of Article 1(b) and,
therefore, the Hague and Hague-Visby rules apply to the sea segment of a multimodal journey.8 5 In reaching this conclusion,
they have interpreted the reference to "carriage of goods by sea"
in Article 1(b) as a clarification that the rules apply only to the
sea legs of multimodal transport operation covered by com80 The issue of the applicability of the CMR was brought before the German
courts as early as the 1980s. See, e.g., BGH June 24, 1987 (I ZR 127/85), 10
TRANSPR 447 (1987) (Ger.); BGH May 17, 1989 (I ZR 2111/87) (Ger.); Quantum
Corp. v. Plane Trucking [20021 2 Lloyd's Rep. 25 (Q.B) 35-37 (Eng.).
81 Comalco Aluminium Ltd. v. Mogal Freight Seros Pty. Ltd. (1993) 113 ALR 677,
700 (Austl.) (obiter); followed by Parlux SpA v M & U Imps. Pty. Ltd. 2008 VSCA
161, [39] (Austi.); RR Rotterdam 17 september 2003, S&S 2007, 63 m.nt. (Neth.);
RR Rotterdam 19 juli 2006, S&S 2007, 84 m.nt. (Neth.).
82 Comalco, [1993] 113 ALR 700 (Austl.); Parlux, [2008] VSCA 161 (Austl.).
83 Tribunal [Trib.] [ordinary court of first instance] of Turin 5 giugno 2002, il
Diritto Marittimo 2003, 1042 (It.); Bhatia Shipping & Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Alcobex Metals Ltd. [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336 (Q.B.) 342 (Eng.).
84 Hague Rules, supra note 52, art. 1(b).

85 SIR GUENTER TREITEL

& FRANcIs

REYNOLDS, CARVER ON BILLS OF LADING

8-

071 (3d ed. 2011); SIR BERNARD EDER, SCRUrON ON CHARTERPARTIES AND BILLS
OF LADING § 20-033 (22d ed. 2011). But see SIMON BAUGHEN, SHIPPING LAw 166-67
(5th ed. 2012).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

88

[ 78

bined transport documents, rather than as a prohibition on applying the rules to combined transport." In addition, as it is
settled law in England and Wales that the rules also apply to
"received for shipment" bills of lading,17 U.K. academics do not
envisage any obstacle in considering a multimodal transport
document, which will usually show receipt of the goods at an
inland point, as a bill of lading for the purposes of the rules." In
fact, applying the Hague regimes to the sea segments of multimodal transport operations is a pragmatic approach that will
go a long way in facilitating trade. The Hague regimes apply to
the majority of shipments worldwide and the opposite conclusion would have created great uncertainty. A contrary view is,
however, supported by German authors.8"
It is worth mentioning that applying the Hague Rules to multimodal transport has also generated significant debate in the
United States, though in a totally different context. There, disputes arose over applying the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA 1936)9o to the road or rail legs of combined sea-land
transport operations and centered on identifying the applicable
liability regime to damages resulting from the inland segment.9
More simply, the debates were about whether COGSA 1936 or
the Carmack Amendment would usually apply to inland transport. 2 The U.S. Supreme Court put an end to a long-standing
circuit split in 2010 by deciding that COGSA 1936, rather than
the Carmack Amendment, governs the rail leg of an overseas
86

& REYNOLDS, supra note 85; EDER, supra note 85.
Hugh Mack v. Burns & Laird Lines [1944] 77 Lloyd's Rep. 377 (C.A.N.I.)
383 (Eng.).
88 TREITEL & REYNOLDS, supra note 85, § 20-033.
89 Stephan Erbe & Philipp Schlienger, Der Multimodal-Vertragim Schweizerischen
Recht, 28 TRANSPR 421, 424 (2005); Klaus Ramming, Probleme der Rechtsanwendung
im Neuen Recht der Multimodalen Befdrderung, 22 TRANSPR 325, 330 (1999).
90 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Pub. L. No. 74-521, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936),
reprinted in note following 46 U.S.C. § 30701 (2006) (previously codified at 46
U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-15 (2000) [hereinafter COGSA].
91 49 U.S.C. § 11706 (2006) (rail carriage); 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (2006) (motor
carriage); see, e.g., Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of Am. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 456 F.3d
54, 56-57, 63, 69 (2006) abrogated by Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 243, 2440, 2442 (2010) (holding that the Carmack Amendment
did not apply to the rail segment of a shipment originating overseas covered by a
through bill of lading). Contra Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F.2d 700,
702 (4th Cir. 1993); Am. Road Serv. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 348 F.3d 565,
568-69 (6th Cir. 2003); Capitol Converting Equip., Inc. v. LEP Transp., Inc., 965
F.2d 391, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1992); Altadis USA, Inc. ex rel. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. Sea Star Line, LLC, 458 F.3d 1288, 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006).
TREITEL
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import shipment under a single through bill of lading. 3 The
Court nonetheless left open whether the Carmack Amendment
applies to rail carriage in the United States under an outbound
ocean through bill of lading.9 4
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the matter. The segmentation of liability for multimodal transport leads to further complexities and legal uncertainty, this time stemming from the
identification of the applicable liability regime to operations
that lie on the borderline between two transport regimes, i.e.,
the loading and unloading processes from and to a different
mode of transport.9 5 It is uncontested that this difficulty arises
mainly because the majority of transport conventions were prepared in the era of unimodalism, and so they have no particular
concern for their interrelationship with other transport regimes
(aside from the multimodal transport cases they specifically
mention)." This is in fact reflected in how most unimodal transport conventions define the period of responsibility of the carrier. With the exception of the Hague regimes that associate the
carrier's period of responsibility with the acts of loading and discharge of the cargo," this period is measured in the rest of the
transport conventions by the time in which carrier is in charge
of the cargo for the purposes of the particular convention," a
93 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 130 S. Ct. at 2446; see also Robert Force, The RegalBeloit Decision: What, if Anything, Would Happen to the Legal Regime for Multimodal
Transport in the United States if It Adopted the Rotterdam Rules, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 685,
689, 693 (2012).
94 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 130 S. Ct. at 2444. This issue was addressed recently by one of the lower federal courts (Southern District of New York), where
it was decided that the Carmack Amendment governed the inland leg of a multimodal shipment originating within the United States and traveling on to Australia on a through bill of lading. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Panalpina, Inc., No.
07 CV 10947(BSJ) 2011 WL 666388, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011).
95 Also, thirty-two out of fifty-eight participants to the study prepared by
Gomez-Acebo & Pombo, Abogados SCP for the Directorate-General for Energy
and Transport in the European Commission gave a negative answer to the question of whether they consider the costs of transferring between modes presently
reasonable and encouraging multimodal transport, mainly because of the lack of
legal certainty that leads into extra costs. See European Commission 2009 Report
on Multimodal Transport, supra note 27, at 113-14.
96 CMNI, supra note 73, art. 2 § 2; CMR, supra note 16, art. 2 § 1; COTIF-CIM
1999, supra note 72, arts. 1 § 4, 38; Montreal Convention, supra note 53, art. 18
§ 4; Warsaw Convention, supra note 53, art. 18 § 3.
97 Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, supra note 52, art. I(e).
98 CMR, supra note 16, art. 17 § 1, COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note 72, art. 23 § 1;
Warsaw Convention, supra note 53, art. 18 § 2. The Montreal Convention follows
the same approach in Article 18 § 3 but this is justified as it is based on the
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concept that has generated legal and factual inquiries, in particular in the context of multimodal transport.99 Accordingly,
drawing a dividing line between international transport conventions has been proved to be a thorny task, as it is not always easy
to ascertain where one unimodal transport regime ends and the
next one begins.10 0
This was, for instance, the dilemma of the German courts
when they demarcated the maritime and road regimes in a case
of cargo damage sustained during transhipment from a sea vessel to a truck. It was clear that the main source of uncertainty
was the extensive application of the maritime regime beyond
discharge because under German law, which was applied, sea
carriage ends upon delivery rather than when the goods are unloaded from the vessel.' In addressing this issue, the BGH took
the view that the ocean carriage ends not at the time of unloading of the cargo from the vessel but only at the moment at which
the cargo is placed on the truck. 0 2 Reversing a previous decision of the OLG Hamburg,' the BGH thus held that, unless
special circumstances arise, the handling of cargo in port is not
a separate leg of land transport governed by the applicable land
regime, and this is true even where special installations are used
and the cargo handling occurs under a particular contract.'
The BGH's ruling has, however, been criticized as too favorable
for the carrier. This is because the decision allows the MTO to
take advantage of clauses in a multimodal transport bill of lading that may exonerate the MTO from liability for cargo loss
respective provision of the Warsaw Convention. Montreal Convention, supra note
53, art. 18 § 3.
- See HR 24 maart 1995, S&S 1995, 72 m.nt. (Iris) (Neth.) (regarding the division between sea and road carriage (under Dutch law, the sea carrier is responsible for the goods for the entire period the goods are in its charge)), BGH Oct.
27, 1978 (I ZR 114/76), NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIF [NJW] 493, 1979
(Ger.); Norton McNaughton, Inc. v. Polar Air Cargo, 702 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760-62
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (regarding the dividing line between air and road).
100See, e.g., Jagenberg, Inc. v. Ga. Ports Auth., 882 F. Supp. 1065, 1077 (S.D.
Ga. 1995).
101 HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGB] [COMMERCIAL CODE], § 606 (Ger.); BGH Nov.
3, 2005 (I ZR 325/02), (2006) EUR. TRANSP. L. 339 (Ger.).
102 BGH Nov. 3, 2005 (I ZR 325/02) (2006) EUR. TRANSP. L. 339, 29 TRANSPR
41 (2006) (Ger.); BGH Oct. 18, 2007 (I ZR 138/04) (2008) EUR. TRANsp. L. 478,
rev'g OLG Hamburg Aug. 19, 2004 (6 U 178/03), 27 TRANSPR 402 (20044)

(Ger.).
OLG Hamburg Aug. 19, 2004, 27 TRANsPR 402 (2004) (Ger.).
For instance, in the OLG Hamburg case, the cargo, which was stowed in a
mafi-trailer, was trucked for 300 meters out of the vessel into a warehouse to be
loaded on a truck for further road transportation. Id.
103
104
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that may occur in the course of the operation of transhipment,
which, under German law, are valid only if the transhipment
(land carriage) is subject to maritime law.'
A different view on the matter is likely to be taken by the U.S.
courts in that they may hold the Harter Act, and not COGSA
1936, applicable to cases involving transhipment from vessels to
trucks. Such an assumption is based on previous rulings of U.S.
courts that have concluded that the liability of carriers under
the Harter Act runs from the moment the goods are discharged
from the vessel until their "proper delivery," which, in cases of
transfer to a truck for further inland transportation, means delivery to the inland carrier.1o' However, what distinguishes the
U.S. cases from the BGH decision is the limited scope of application of the sea regime (COGSA 1936) to "tackle-to-tackle" operations and the enactment of a separate regime (the Harter Act)
for the pre-loading and post-discharge stage. In any case, it is
evident that the U.S. position is not especially favorable to the
MTO, which is only entitled to rely on the limited range of defenses prescribed in the Harter Act,0' rather than the full list of
exceptions provided in COGSA 1936. The MTO will also be in
exactly the same position even if COGSA is set to apply to the
handling operations pursuant to a "period of responsibility"
clause, due to the predominance of the Harter Act over the
COGSA provision with respect to the pre-loading and post-discharge periods. 0
See also Herber, supra note 12, at 34-35.
106 Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. A/P Moller-Maersk A/S, 482 F. Supp. 2d 357,
360 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (following Mannesman Demag Corp. v. M/V CONCERT EXPRESS, 225 F.3d 587, 594, (5th Cir. 2000)). It is worth noting that in both cases
the issue was whether the Harter Act applies to the inland segment of the cargo's
carriage under a through bill of lading, rather than whether it applies to cargo
damaged during transhipment. Id. It is, however, the definition of "proper delivery" that may be of importance and may be applied by analogy to the cases of
transhipment. The same definition was also adopted in Jagenberg, Inc. v. Georgia
Ports Authority, whereby the cargo was damaged while being retrieved from the
storage area in the port of discharge and before it was loaded onto a truck for
transportation to its final destination. 882 F. Supp. 1065, 1077-78 (S.D. Ga.
1995); see also Watkins v. M/V LONDON SENATOR, 112 F. Supp. 2d 511, 519
(E.D. Va. 2000) (holding the carrier was liable under the Harter Act for damages
incurred during transportation of cargo from vessel to storage shed at pier).
107 See Harter Act, supra note 13, § 30706.
108 See COGSA, supra note 90, § 12; Uncle Ben's Int'l Div. of Uncle Ben's, Inc.
v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, 855 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1988). For instance, the fire and the quarantine exceptions provided in COGSA have been
held inapplicable to pre-loading and post-discharge cases to which COGSA applied under a period of responsibility clause. R. L. Pritchard & Co. v. Steamship
105
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Also, in the light of the stance taken in Quantum' and, in
particular, the adoption of the network liability principle, one
may assume that the English courts are also likely to adopt a
different approach than that adopted by German courts should
a transhipment case fall before them. What would make a great
difference would be adopting not only a network approach, but
also a clear delimitation of the Hague-Visby Rules to "tackle-totackle" sea carriage. This would simplify matters as the rules
would not apply beyond discharge from the vessel unless there
was a contractual extension to that effect. Thus, the regime applicable to transhipment cargo losses would be either the
Hague-Visby Rules, the national law applicable to the domestic
road leg and ancillary services, 10 or the CMR, if the road leg
crosses borders. Then, under a network liability scheme, identifying the applicable rules would depend on the location of the
cargo loss, that is, whether it occurred during discharge from
the vessel and subsequent loading on the truck, or while awaiting transhipment while in control of the sea or road carrier or a
third party. And, even if a sea carrier attempted to apply the
Hague regimes to inland parts of transportation through a period of responsibility clause, this clause would not affect application of the CMR to the international road carriage. Such a
clause would be held ineffective as a stipulation that purports to
derogate from the provisions of Article 41, Section 1 of the
CMR."1 Thus, the court would decide that the road carrier's
period of responsibility under the CMR commences when the
road carrier takes charge of the goods for the purpose of international road carriage, not when the goods are placed on the

lorry.' 1 2
The legal uncertainty does not end here. Identifying the rules
applicable to occurrences during the period of packing or storage of goods has also proved to be an intricate issue. Indeed,
once again it becomes a question of interpreting the scope of
international transport conventions and, at times, of contract
terms, with a view to ascertaining whether the respective operaHellenic Laurel, 342 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (fire defense); Sunpride
(Cape) (Pty.) Ltd. v. Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A., No. 01 Civ. 3493 (CSH),
2003 WL 22682268, at *28-34 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2003) (quarantine exemption).
109 See Quantum Corp. Inc. v. Plane Trucking [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 25 (Eng.).
110The domestic road carrier is liable in contract (i.e., Road Haulage Association Ltd.'s Conditions of Carriage) or in tort.
In See CMR, supra note 16, art. 41 § 1.
112 See id. art. 17 § 1.
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tions are ancillary to a particular transport leg. If so, the terms
are absorbed by the pertinent international unimodal transport
convention or domestic transport rules. Again, this is a circumstantial issue, but the deciding factor is whether the preconditions for applying the pertinent international transport
convention are met, that is whether the carrier is in charge of
the cargo for the purposes of a particular treaty.
For example, in a case arising out of cargo transportation covered by a through or combined transport bill, English courts
have ruled in favor of applying the Hague-Visby Rules to the
intermediate storage period (between two periods of sea carriage) of a container at port.11 This was, however, only because
the Hague-Visby Rules applied throughout the transport operation. 14 That is because, in the particular case, once the rules
came into operation, they continued in force until the end of
the sea carriage."' Otherwise, the storage would have fallen
outside the scope of the rules because it would not have been
deemed related to the "carriage of goods by sea."' It is also
likely that German courts will adopt the same approach for intermediate storage if German law governs the multimodal carriage contract, because the carrier's period of responsibility for
sea carriage in Germany runs from receipt of cargo for carriage
to its delivery."'
Also, regarding storage that precedes or follows a single sea
leg, German courts have already decided that storing goods in a
port or nearby for a short period is ancillary to sea carriage and
therefore governed by sea transport rules.11 8 The end result is
again favorable for the MTO, which, as noted above, will be entitled to rely on the generous exemption clauses available under
German maritime law. This will not, however, be the same
under U.S. law, where storing goods in a port while in the
113 Mayhew Foods v. Overseas Containers Ltd. [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 317
(Q.B.) 317-20 (U.K.); see also GLAss, supra note 14, 1 3B.8.
114 Mayhew Foods 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 320.
115 Id.
116 Compare id., with Captain v. Far E. S.S. Co. [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 595
(B.C.S.C.) 601-02 (Can.) (holding that the Hague Rules did not apply to the part
of the contract under which the goods were on the dock at Singapore since that
part of the contract did not relate to the "carriage of goods by water."). The
difference between the two cases was that, in FarEastern, there were two separate
bills of lading for two sea legs, as opposed to one combined bill covering the
entire transport operation as in Mayhew. See id.
117 HGB § 606 (Ger.).
118 OLG Hamburg Feb. 28, 2008 (6 U 241/06), 31 TRANsPR 125 (2008) (Ger.).
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charge of a sea carrier is subject to the Harter Act, which applies
to the pre-loading and the post-discharge periods in both foreign and domestic trade (but only while the carrier is in custody
of the cargo)."19 Once again, unlike its position under German
law, the MTO will be entitled to avail itself only of the defenses
provided in the Harter Act, which are limited in comparison to
those provided in COGSA 1936.120 Nor will the MTO be in a
better position even if the COGSA 1936 applies to warehousing
goods in port under a "period of responsibility" clause. This is
because, as explained above, any provision of COGSA 1936 that
is incompatible with the Harter Act will yield to the Harter Act,
thus depriving the MTO of defenses that are only available to it
under COGSA 1936.121
It may be also the case that some courts will conclude that the
CMR applies to packing and warehousing goods prior to the
road leg of a multimodal transport operation if the packing or
warehousing are considered ancillary to the road carriage, i.e. if
the parties to the contract so agreed, 12 2 or even absent such an
express agreement, if can be inferred from the circumstances.123
In the same vein, storing cargo immediately before or after an
air leg may also be considered part of air carriage if the carrier
has taken, or is still in charge of, the cargo, an issue that may
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 1 24 Although extending the CMR and the Warsaw and Montreal conventions to
storage may be more straightforward in cases where the air or
road segment is the first leg of a multimodal transport operation-it will be easier to prove that the carrier took over the
goods for the purposes of the applicable road or air conven119 COGSA, supra note 90, § 12; Harter Act, supra note 13, § 30702. See Uncle
Ben's Int'l Div. of Uncle Ben's, Inc. v. Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, 855 F.2d
215, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1988); Levatino Co. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 233 F.
Supp. 697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
120 See Harter Act, supra note 13, § 30706.
121 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., RR Rotterdam 22 october 1993, S&S 1997, 53 (Neth.); CLARKE,
INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY ROAD: CMR, supra note 58, 1 28 (supporting the same view in the context of unimodal transport). But see ANDREW MESSENT
& DAVID A. GLAss, HILL & MESSENT CMR: CONTRACT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY RoAD 1 6.8 (2000).
123 See, e.g., BGH Jan. 12, 2012 (I ZR 214/10), (2012) EUR. TRANsP. L. (Ger.)
(regarding carriage of goods solely by road).
124 Warsaw Convention, supra note 53, art. 18 § 2.; Montreal Convention, supra
note 53, art. 18 § 3; see, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court forjudicial
matters] Com., 28 May 1996, Bull. civ. IV, No. 94-1055, (1997) EUR. TRANsP. L.
129 (Fr.).
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tion 12 -the situation is further complicated where the road or
air transport is the intermediate or final leg. A good illustration
of such a scenario can be found in a decision by the Supreme
Court of Austria in which goods were damaged while stored between the modes of transport (road and rail) .12' There, the
court ruled against applying either of the regimes governing
those respective modes, which preceded and followed storage,
that is the rules that applied to the rail leg and the CMR, because it found that the storage fell outside the scope of both
regimes. The court held that the goods were no longer under
the control of the railways and the transportation by road had
not yet begun.12 ' Thus, even if courts adopt a pro-CMR interpretation of the term "take over," by reading Article 1(1) as referring to the start of the contractually provided or permitted road
leg,1 2 there will still be complex factual inquiries concerning
whether the road carrier did in fact take over the goods for purposes of the CMR. If not, then the intermediate storage period
will be subject to national laws, thereby leading to fluctuating
rights and obligations in different jurisdictions.1 2
What all of the above examples confirm is that the confusion
and uncertainty pertaining to the existing legal framework on
multimodal transport is not simply caused by the number of legal and factual inquiries that arise out of applying unimodal
transport conventions, but also by the proliferation of divergent
legal approaches. What further exacerbates the situation is that
the conflicting decisions of different national courtsso encourage forum shopping. For example, the issue of applying international transport conventions to separate legs of multimodal
transport operations is not only theoretical, but it also has considerable financial implications. Liability limits, or the opportunity for cargo interests to break those limits, may differ
significantly depending on the rules a court will apply to a mul125 CMR, supra note 16, art. 17 § 1; see Quantum Corp. v. Plane Trucking Ltd.
[2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 25 (Q.B.) 39 (U.K.).
126 Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [supreme court] July 13, 1994, (7 Ob 586/
93), 18 TRANSPR 21 (1995) (Austria).
127 Id. at 22.
128 See CMR, supra note 16, ar. 1 § 1; see also Quantum [2002] Lloyd's Rep. at 33
(interpreting "take over" in the multimodal transport context).
129 For other issues that may cause legal uncertainty, see ASARIOTIS ET AL., supra
note 27, at 18-19; UNECE Report (July 3, 2000), supra note 41, 11 26-32. See also
supra note 52.
13sSee, e.g., the discussion infra on the division over the applicability of the
CMR.
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timodal contract of carriage. Thus, it is likely that affected parties will be incentivized to bring cases before national courts
more favorable to their interests. A prime example of the impact
that identifying the applicable regime may have is the English
Court of Appeal case Quantum.'3 1 It was only because the court
held the CMR applicable to the road leg of an air-road transportation that the cargo interests were given the chance to rely on
Article 29 of the CMR in an attempt to break CMR liability limits
on grounds of wilful misconduct or equivalent default on the
part of the carrier-Air France.13 2 Hypothetically speaking, if
the same case were brought before the German courts, for instance, a decision more favorable to Air France could be expected. The CMR would not apply and limitations on liability
would be governed by Article 11.7 of the general conditions of
carriage by air for cargo, which limits liability to 17 Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs) per kilogram and has no provision for
evading these monetary limits. 3
The question then becomes whether a uniform liability
scheme alone, providing for the application of independent
rules throughout a multimodal journey, will avoid the legal ambiguity generated by the potential application of unimodal
transport conventions to multimodal transport operations, and
thus provide a greater degree of legal certainty to prevent unnecessary litigation and forum shopping. The answer would
have been in the affirmative if consensus existed that a multimodal transport contract is a sui generis (aliud) contract (a
contract with its own characteristics different from unimodal
contracts of transport) governed only by particular multimodal
transport rules and not pertinent unimodal transport treaties.' 3 4
There is no doubt that in such a case, the uniform liability
scheme would avoid legal uncertainty stemming from the application of unimodal transport conventions, which is inherent in
existing multimodal transport rules. This is unfortunately not
the case. What muddies the waters is that the direct applicability
131 [2002] 2
132 Id. at 41.

Lloyd's Rep. 25 (Eng.).
The issue of the proving "wilful misconduct" was remitted to the
Commercial Court to be dealt with there. Id.
133 SeeBGHJuly 17, 2008 (I ZR 181/05), (2009) EUR. TRANSP. L. 196 (Ger.); see
also Quantum Corp. v. Plane Trucking Ltd. [2001] C.L.C. 1192 (Q.B.) 1207
(Eng.) (holding that the CMR did not apply to the road leg where the damage
occurred).
134 See, e.g., ASARIOTIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 25; CLARKE, ISIC FINAL REPORT
(2005), supra note 27, at 13;Jackson, supra note 57, at G5 (discussing the counterargument to the application of the Warsaw Convention to multimodal contracts).
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of unimodal transport conventions to separate legs of a multimodal journey has been advocated, as have the multimodal
transport operations clearly prescribed in their rules,13 5 which
support this view even if the multimodal carriage contract is classified as a sui generis (aliud) contract136 (as opposed to a chain
of contracts, which makes application of individual transport
conventions straightforward' 3 7 ). Thus, it is likely that, in at least
some jurisdictions, parties to multimodal contracts of carriage
would be exposed to the same legal risks as if a network or a
modified network liability scheme applied to their contracts,
even though a uniform regime would apply to the multimodal
transport operation. In fact, the issue of applying unimodal
transport conventions would become even more complex, as the
terms of unimodal transport treaties would overlap with the uni13 As the risk
form rules of the international multimodal regime."
1 39
of such conflicts cannot be ignored, steps would need to be
135 CMNI, supra note 43, art. 2 § 1; COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note 73, art. 1 §§ 4,
38; Montreal Convention, supra note 54, arts. 38, 18 § 4; Hamburg Rules, supra
note 54, art. 1(6); CMR, supra note 16, art. 2§ 2; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Orient
Overseas Containers Lines (UK) Ltd., 230 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Quantum [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 25 (Eng.); RR Rotterdam 17 september 2003, S&S
2007, 63 m.nt. (Neth.); RR Rotterdam 19 juli 2006, S&S 2007, 84 m.nt. (Neth.).
'3
See Rolf Herber, Zur Bericksichtigung des Teilstreckenrecht bei Multimodalem
Transportvertragin FESTSCHRIFT FOR HENNING PIPER 877, 886 (W. Erdmann, W.
Gloy & R. Herber eds. 1996); see alsoJackson, supra note 55, at G1-2, G5 (addressing the UN Multimodal Transport Convention); MARIAN HOEKS, MULTIMODAL
TRANSPORT LAw: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE MULTIMODAL CONTACT FOR THE
CARRIAGE OF GoODS §§ 2.3.2.1.3, 2.3.2.2 (2010).
137 See, e.g., Quantum [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 25 (Eng.); HartfordFire Ins., 230
F.3d at 549; see also David A. Glass, Meddling in the Multimodal Muddle?-A Network
of Conflict in the UNCITRAL Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or
Partly][by Sea], LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 307, 313-15 (2006); Jan Ramberg,
Deviation from the Legal Regime of CMR in INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GoODS BY
ROAD (CMR) 19, 22 (Jan Theunis ed. 1987).
138 The issue of the clashes between the multimodal and unimodal conventions is more pressing in Europe, where the majority of international conventions
on unimodal transport apply (i.e., CMR, COTIF-CIM 1999, and CMNI, in addition to international regimes on air transport that apply worldwide). It should be
also noted that a regional convention on international road transport (1989 Inter-American Convention on International Carriage of Goods by Road) was negotiated within the Organization of American States (OAS) but has not, however,
entered into force so there is no issue of overlap with respect to that convention,
at least at the moment. See Paul B. Larsen, 1989 Inter-American Convention on International Carriageof Goods by Road, 39 AM. J. Comp. L. 121 (1991).
139 The same issue was also raised in the course of negotiations of the UN
Multimodal Transport Convention (mainly by the United Kingdom) and the Rotterdam Rules. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Working Group III (Transport Law) Rep. on
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taken to resolve potential collision of conventions. 140 If solved, it
could address to a certain extent the remaining issues related to
applying unimodal transport treaties. Much would depend,
though, on political bargaining, which is expected to play a significant role in reaching an acceptable solution.14 '
3.

Resolving the Conflicts Between the InternationalMultimodal
Transport Rules and the Existing Unimodal Transport
Treaties: What is the Way Forward?

In theory, the clashes between an international multimodal
transport regime and existing unimodal transport conventions
could be resolved either by drafting explicit conflict-of-laws provisions or by recourse to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of the Treaties (Vienna Convention),142 which applies
as a residual rule between member states to the convention.14 3 It
is doubtful, however, whether resort to the Vienna Convention
would provide an adequate solution, at least in the case of overlap between international multimodal and unimodal transport
conventions. First of all, the Vienna Convention applies only to
parties that have ratified or otherwise accepted its rules. Therefore, it would present an adequate solution to possible conflicts
only if all parties to the new multimodal convention are also
the Work of its 11th Sess., Mar. 24-Apr. 4, 2003, 1l 254-60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
526 (May 9, 2003).
140 In a strict sense, a conflict of conventions occurs when a party to two treaties cannot simultaneously honor its obligations under both. Applying a broader
definition, such a conflict occurs when a state is party to two or more treaties and
either the mere existence of, or the actual performance under, one treaty will
frustrate the purpose of another treaty. See generally ChristopherJ. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO WASH. INT'L L. REV. 573, 575 (2005); Wilfred C. Jenks,
The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 401, 426 (1953); Felipe
Paolillo, Article 30-Convention de 1969 in LES CONVENTIONS DE VIENNE SUR LE
DROIT DES TRAITtS 1247, 1265-66 (Oliver Corten & Pierre Klein eds. 2006). Conflicts between the multimodal and unimodal conventions would therefore arise
only in the areas of the conventions that overlap, i.e., liability, limits of liability,
time limits, etc.
141 See generally Borgen, supra note 140, at 576, 605.
142 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
143 See SIR LAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 97
(2d ed. 1984); MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAw OF TREATIES 403 (2009); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Article 30-Application of Successive TreatiesRelating to the Same Subject Matter, in 1 THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 764, 774-75 (Oliver Corten &
Pierre Klein eds. 2011).
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parties to the Vienna Convention.'" But even if this ever materializes, it is debatable whether Article 30 of the convention would
prescribe a systematic and efficient solution to the 'conflicts at
issue. The first hurdle is the non-retroactivity of the Vienna Convention established in Article 4, which provides that its provisions do not apply to treaties concluded by state parties prior to
the convention's entry into force for that particular state,1 5 save
insofar as they are declaratory of customary international law.'
It is not, however, settled whether Article 30 reflects established
customary law. The majority of leading scholars,14 7 as well as the
International Law Commission's (ILC) Report on Fragmentation of International Law,' 4 tend to agree that at least some of
the rules set out in Article 30-the lex posterio 149 and pacta tertiis 5 0-are an expression of existing norms of customary law.
The opposite view has, however, also been echoed.'5 ' Thus, if
Article 30 were to be classified as a progressive development of
the law of the treaties, then Article 30 would not cover all the
pertinent treaty conflicts. For example, the non-retroactivity
144 So far, the VCLT has 111 parties, not including the United States or European countries like France. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, available at http://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%2011/Chapter%20XXIII/
XXIII-1.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
14Vienna Convention, supra note 142, art. 4. For twenty-five states, the Vienna
Convention entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980, but for the rest of the eighty-six
it did later, even as late as Apr. 1, 2010. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 144.
146 International customary law is created by a constant and uniform usage
practiced by the states in question, combined with their opinio juris. Asylum
(Colom. / Peru), Judgment, 1950, I.C.J. Reports 266, 276 (Nov. 20).
147 ANTHONY AusT, MODERN TREATY LAw AND PRACTICE 228 (2d ed. 2007); ViLLIGER, supra note 143, at 410; Jan B. Mus, Conflicts Between Treaties in International
Law, NETHER. INT'L L. REV., XLV 208, 211-12 (1998); Orakhelashvili, supra note
143; Manfred Zuleeg, Vertragskonkurrenz im Vdlkerrecht, Teil I: Vertrage Zwischen
Souverdnen Staaten, 20 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 246, 257 (1977).
14 Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Study
Group of the International Law Commission on the Fragmentation of International Law, 11 225, 228, 243, 252; UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter Koskenniemi Report on
Fragmentation of International Law]. It should be noted that this report is often
cited as authority for a position, the ILC being the leading jurists who can help to
codify international law. See MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE
INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 298-99 (2011).
149 Lex Posteriorderogate lege prior.
150 Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.
151 See NELE MATZ, WEGE ZUR KOORDINIERUNG VOLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE
316 (2005).
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rule, as embodied in Article 4, would have precluded the application of Article 30 at least regarding states that adopted the
Vienna Convention at the same time as the new multimodal
transport convention, but had also concluded other international transport conventions before that date.'12 But even if the
above obstacles could be overcome, it is still doubtful whether
such conflicts fall into the ambit of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention because its scope is limited to conflicts between treaties
"relating to the same subject matter." Thus, a lot would depend
on the interpretation of the "same subject matter," which is
deemed to be satisfied if the fulfillment of the obligation under
one treaty affects the fulfillment of the obligation of another. 5 1
If the phrase were construed strictly, excluding international
conventions with different foci but overlapping issue areas,' 5 4
then unimodal and multimodal transport conventions, which
touch on the same issues but do not really seek to supplant each
other, would probably fall outside the scope of Article 30. On
the other hand, if the view were taken that characterizations
("multimodal transport," "air carriage," etc.) have no normative
value per se,' 5 then the precondition of the "same subject matter" may be met, as concurrent application of multimodal and
relevant unimodal transport conventions to the same facts
would probably lead to incompatible results,1' 6 as in application
of different liability rules, for example. In addition, one might
argue that Article 30 of the Vienna Convention is not designed
to avoid conflicts between private law conventions because it is
intended to regulate "the rights and obligations of state parties
152 Unimodal transport treaties that the state has expressed its consent to be
bound. See generally Frederic Dopagne, Article 4: Non-Retroactivity of the Present Convention in 1 THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY,
supra note 143, at 81-82; Paul V. MacDade, The Effect of Article 4 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 35 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 499, 508-10 (1986).
153 SINCLAIR, supra note 143, at 98; E.W. Vierdag, The Time of the "Conclusion" of
a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
Related Provisions, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75, 100 (1988); Koskenniemi Report on
Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 148, 1 254.
154 See generally Borgen, supra note 140, at 603-04, 612.
155 Koskenniemi Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note
148, 1 21.
156 See Vierdag, supra note 154, at 100, cited with approval in Koskenniemi Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 148,
22-23. It is also
worthy to note that the issue of the sameness of the subject matter has been
raised by neither Diamond nor Jackson in their respective papers on the U.N.
Multimodal Transport Convention. See Diamond, supra note 52, at C10; Jackson,
supra note 56, at G6.
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to successive treaties."m Therefore, as a state party would discharge its obligations under the pertinent transport convention
by meaningfully implementing the convention into its domestic
law, it could be argued that by the time a dispute between an
MTO and cargo interests falls before a court, the state's interest
in applying the convention would be "tenuous or nominal."1 5 8
Thus, the best solution by far for avoiding treaty conflicts
would be treaty clauses that clearly and precisely spell out the
new international multimodal transport convention's synergies
with unimodal transport treaties.1 5' The drafting of such clauses
would be a delicate exercise and particular attention should be
given to the danger of conflicts arising not only from the applicability of transport treaties to single legs of multimodal transport operations, but also to operations that entail the
combination of different transport modes, which are exceptionally regulated in the existing unimodal transport conventions. 5 0
That leaves drafters with the strenuous task of identifying the
optimal solution to all possible conflicts, if indeed there is any. If
one were, however, to evaluate the options open to drafters, one
could easily conclude that there are not many, as a great number of solutions that might have been available in other conflicts
would not be available here for various reasons.
First, the denunciation of unimodal transport conventions,
which is usually successful in resolving conflicts with conventions
with overlapping subject matters,'
would not be a recommended conflict-solution technique here simply because it
157 Vienna Convention, supra note 142, art. 30 § 1; see also Diamond, supra note
52, at C10-11 (regarding the UN Multimodal Transport Convention).
158 See Diamond, supra note 51, at C1I (raising the same argument regarding
the applicability of the Vienna Convention to the UN Multimodal Transport Convention). See also id. at C11-12.
159 This is generally considered to be the best option. See generally AusT, supra
note 147, at 218; Borgen, supra note 140, at 584, 636.
160 See CMNI, supra note 74, art. 2 § 2; COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note 73, arts. I
§ 4, 38; CMR, supra note 16, art. 2 § 1. Whether the respective provisions of the
Warsaw and the Montreal Conventions would also conflict with the new multimodal transport instrument would depend on the scope of application of the
multimodal convention and in particular, whether or not the operation of pickup and delivery of goods carried out in the performance of a unimodal transport
contract, would qualify as international multimodal transport. In the case of the
U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention, it was not. See U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention, supra note 1, art. I § 1; see also Warsaw Convention, supra note
54, art. 18 § 3; Montreal Convention, supra note 54, art. 18 § 4.
161 See, e.g., Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5, art. 89 (regarding the denunciation
of the existing maritime conventions).
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would solve one problem by creating many more. More specifically, if the new multimodal convention were to provide that
each state that ratifies or otherwise adopts its rules must denounce all unimodal transport conventions to which it is a party
(from the time of the entry into force of the multimodal transport convention with respect to that state), then there would be
no scope for conflicts. It would be the international multimodal
transport convention alone claiming applicability to the entire
multimodal transport operation. Denouncing the existing carriage conventions would eradicate conflicts, but it would nevertheless create a gap regarding the applicable regime to singlemode carriage operations, leading to further disharmony, only
on the unimodal transport front this time (at least with regard
to the states that would unilaterally terminate their participation
in those treaties).
It is, therefore, worth exploring whether incompatibility between the new multimodal and existing unimodal transport conventions may be addressed through other procedures, such as
reviewing all of the international unimodal transport conventions.'12 A revision to that effect would entail modifying both the
definition of "contract of carriage" in existing carriage conventions and the respective provisions that expressly stipulate the
application of these conventions to unimodal legs of multimodal transport to clarify that they apply only to carriage performed exclusively by the particular mode concerned' 6 3-save
for cases in which such conventions expressly extend their applicability to other modes of transport, which exist in order to accommodate specific cases of carriage performed under two
transport modes 64 and should therefore not be disturbed. Undoubtedly, a limitation of their scope of application would avoid
treaty conflicts, but it would only be effective if also combined
with a clause governing the interrelationship between the new
multimodal transport convention and provisions of transport
conventions that apply to carriage by other transport means. In
162 CMNI, supra note 74, art. 36; COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note 73, arts. 33-35;
CMR, supra note 16, art. 49; Warsaw Convention, supra note 54, art. 41.
163 This clarification would address the point made in Quantum Corp. Inc. v.
Plane Trucking that the CMR Convention does not require that the freight carriage by road is part of ajourney exclusively performed by road. (2002] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 25 (C.A.) 40 (Eng.).
164 CMNI, supra note 74, art. 2 § 2; COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note 73, arts. 1 § 4,
38; Montreal Convention, supra note 54, art. 18 § 4; CMR, supra note 16, art. 2
§ 1; Warsaw Convention, supra note 54, art. 18 § 3.
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such a case, no clash would be conceivable because transport
conventions by different transport modes would not claim applicability to individual legs of multimodal transport operations.
This would, however, be too good to be true, as it is unlikely that
revising current transport conventions to that effect could happen. Most existing transport conventions are either fairly new' 65
or have been revised quite recently.'6 6 Nonetheless, none of
them has clarified their applicability to multimodal transport
operations, even though this matter had already been brought
before the courts when these conventions were drafted or
modified.1 6 1
In a similar vein, modifying unimodal transport conventions
to limit their scope, though only between parties to the
unimodal transport convention that would adopt the international multimodal transport instrument, is not an option that
could be exercised-again at least in this case of conflicts.
Though such a modification inter se would have avoided conflicts for the same reasons explained in the case of review of the
conventions, unfortunately, it could not operate here. The operation of the principle of modificatory inter se agreements, which
reflects a rule of customary law also embodied in Article 41 of
the Vienna Convention,""6 is caught in this case by Article 1, Section 5 of the CMR, which expressly prohibits its parties from
varying any of its provisions by special agreements between two
or more of them, except to make it inapplicable to their frontier
traffic or to authorize use in transport operations confined to
their territory of consignment notes representing title to goods.
And, this is not the only case in which the CMR creates obstacles
to solutions for the conflicts at issue. It is also the two-way
mandatory system established in Article 41 of the CMR-alongside Article 25 of the CMNI-that removes from the equation
the possibility of resolving conflicts through establishing liability
for multimodal transport in excess of minimum liability and
166 See CMNI, supra note 74 (adopted by the Diplomatic Conference Organized
Jointly by the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, the Danube
Commission and UN/ECE, held in Budapest from Sept. 25-Oct. 3, 2000); see also
Montreal Convention, supra note 54 (adopted by a diplomatic meeting of International Civil Aviation Organization member States on May 28, 1999).
166 See supra note 7.
167 See supra note 79.
16 See, e.g., VILLIGER, supra note 143, at 538; Anne Rigaux & Denys Simon,
Article 41: Agreement to Modify Treaties Between Certain of the Parties Only in 2 THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 986, 994 (Corten
& Pierre Klein eds. 2011). Contra SINCLAIR, supra note 143, at 14.
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monetary limits provided for in unimodal transport conventions. 1 69 This is because unlike transport conventions that only
prohibit decreasing carrier liability and would therefore be compatible with this solution,o both the CMNI and the CMR add to
derogation not only any decreases in a carrier's liability, but also
increases."'7 Unless both the CMR and the CMNI are amended
to avoid the above difficulties, none of the above solutions are
available. This would nonetheless be very unlikely as there seems
to be little to no appetite from the transport industry to change
a legal instrument that works rather well in practice.17 2
This leaves us with the alternative of incorporating conflicts
provisions in the new multimodal transport instrument that
would expressly deal with synergies between the international
multimodal transport treaty and the international unimodal
transport conventions, including a separate clause on its interrelationship with their provisions that extend application to other
modes of transport. Drafting such provisions would not be an
easy task, as the previous experience of the UN Multimodal
Transport Convention has shown.17 3 Thoughtful drafting requires careful consideration of both types of conflicts and close
attention to the particularities of each one. Starting with the latter, one could argue that the collision of conventions in that
169 This alternative was proposed in the case of the European instrument on
multimodal transport. See AsAOTIs, supra note 27, at 28, 30; see also Malcolm A.

Clarke, The Transport Goods in Europe:Patterns and Problems of Uniforn Law, LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 36, 68 (1999) (European regulation); Clarke, Carrier'sLiability
in Cross-BorderAir Cargo Substitute Transportation,supra note 58, at 185 (advancing
the same arguments regarding the UNCITRAL Draft Convention on the Carriage
of Goods [wholly or partly] [by Sea] (now Rotterdam Rules)).
170 COTIF-CIM, 1999, supra note 73, art. 5; Montreal Convention, supra note
54, art. 47; Hamburg Rules, supra note 54, art. 23 § 1-2; Hague and Hague Visby
Rules, supra note 53, art. III, r. 8.
171 CMNI, supra note 74, arts. 20 § 4, 25; CMR, supra note 16, art. 41 § 1.
CMNI, however, allows increase only with respect to liability limits where the nature and higher value of goods or articles of transport have been expressly specified in the transport document and the carrier has not refuted those
specifications, or where the parties have expressly agreed to higher maximum
limits of liability. CMNI, supranote 74, arts. 20 § 4, 25. It also allows for the inclusion of some additional defences related to inland waterways carriage. Id. art. 21
§ 2.
172 See Malcolm A. Clarke, The Line in Law between Land and Sea, J. Bus. L. 522,
524 (2003) (regarding the CMR); Rolf Herber, CMR: UNIDROIT Should Not Let
This Child Go!, 3 UNIr. L. REv. 475, 478 (1998).
173 U.N. Multimodal Transport Convention, supra note 1, arts. 30 § 4, 38; Diamond, supra note 52, at C13-14; Jackson, supra note 56, at G8-9; DE WIT, supra
note 17, 11 2.221-2.236, 2.245-2.249.
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case can be avoided if priority is given to provisions of unimodal
conventions that extend to other modes of transport on the basis of the lex specialis.174 This solution is based on the premise
that provisions of unimodal transport conventions that apply to
other transport modes are special types of multimodal transport
and should therefore prevail over general provisions of a new
international multimodal convention."7 This seems to be a sensible approach as it preserves the applicability of provisions to
special types of transport, reflecting long-established practices.
Such a priority clause must then be coupled with rules that
would provide for the interrelationship of the multimodal transport convention with the remaining provisions of existing international transport conventions. What, however, makes
elaborating such conflict rules complicated is the pacta tertiis
principle, which makes indispensable the adoption of a tiered
approach based on whether a multimodal transport operation is
performed between two state parties to it.17 6 If it is, there is no
obstacle in making a new multimodal transport instrument
mandatorily applicable to the carriage contract, leaving no
scope for applying a unimodal transport convention and in turn
for conflicts.1 7 1 If, however, the multimodal transport is between
states, one of which is a party to the new multimodal convention
and both of which are bound by another unimodal convention,
this solution would not work because an international treaty
174 See generally Koskenniemi Report on Fragmentation of International Law,
supra note 148, 1 116-18 (on the requirement of speciality in regard to "subjectmatter").
175 The prevailing view is that transport under these rules is a special type of
multimodal transport. See, e.g., CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY
ROAD: CMR, supra note 58,
15; GLAss, supra note 14, 1 3.97; HILL & MESSENT,
supra note 122, 1 2.1; HOEKS, supra note 136, at 2.3.3.3; Ramberg, supra note 137,
THE LIABILITY OF THE CARRIER UNDER THE CMR 92-93
at 22. But see K.F. HK,
(1986); Loewe, supra note 52, at 330-31. See also HUIBERT DRION, LIMITATION OF
LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAw 976 (1954), art. 18.3, 1 76 (with respect to
Warsaw Convention); Grinter Kirchhof, Der Lufifrachtvertrag als Multimodaler Vertrag im Rahmen des Montrealer Ubereinkommen, 30 TRANSPR 133, 134 (2007) (not a
special type of multimodal transport); CHRISTOPHER SHAWCROSS & K.M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 1 345 (2012) (multimodal transport).
176This solution resembles to the approach adopted in the Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention, supra note 142, art. 30 § 4. See also UN Multimodal
Transport Convention, supra note 1, art. 38; Diamond, supra note 52, at C13 (for
the interpretation of "a case relating to international multimodal transport subject to this Convention which takes place").
177 See a similar approach in the UN Multimodal Transport Convention, supra
note 1, art. 3 (adopting a similar solution analogous to that of the Vienna Convention, art. 30 § 4(a)).
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cannot impose obligations on third states without consent (pacta
tertiis non nocent). Therefore, in such a case, the collision of conventions would be avoided by giving priority to provisions of the
otherwise applicable unimodal transport convention.
Though including conflicts provisions appears to be a viable
solution, it is not free of difficulties. Its success and, to a certain
extent, the success of the new multimodal transport convention,
would depend on whether pro-CMR states will accept a conflicts
clause that implicitly denounces applying the CMR to road legs
of multimodal transport operations, at least where the multimodal contract is performed between two member states to
the new multimodal convention. Of course, this is a matter of
negotiation and political compromise and the outcome would
not be predictable. In addition, it is a solution that leaves uncertainty regarding the applicability of unimodal transport conventions to a multimodal journey, the applicable regime to
borderline cases and ancillary services. But, obviously, these
cases would be limited. Applying unimodal transport conventions would be allowed only if multimodal transport is between
states, only one of which being party to the new multimodal convention. This is only because a contrary solution would have violated the pacta tertiis non nocent rule.
Moreover, matters would be further complicated if the Rotterdam Rules, which extend their application to "wet multimodal"
transport, ever enter into force. As transport under the Rotterdam Rules would be classified as a special type of multimodal
transport, it is safe to assume that possible conflicts between the
new multimodal transport regime and the Rotterdam Rules
would be resolved though application of lex specialis. One
should, however, go beyond the legal framework and consider
the practical ramifications of such a solution that gives priority
to the Rotterdam Rules. It is not only the increasing volume of
containerized goods carried by the combination of sea and
other modes,"'7 but also the extensive scope of the Rotterdam
Rules, which apply even if a minor sea leg is contemplated in the
contract of carriage,'

that will have a negative impact on the

range and number of operations to which the new multimodal
transport convention would apply. It is thus'likely that in such a
178 See, e.g., Multimodal Transport: The Feasibility of an InternationalLegal Instrument, supra note 4, 1 6; UNCITRAL Working Group on Transport Law Rep. on
the Work of its 9th Sess. (April 15-26, 2002), 1 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/510 (May
7, 2002).
179 Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5, art. 1.1.
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case, the scope of the multimodal transport instrument would
be reduced significantly.
4.

Legal Certainty-OtherIssues

In addition to the legal ambiguity associated with the application of unimodal transport conventions, the segmentation of liability for multimodal transport leads to further legal uncertainty
stemming from conflicting decisions of the national courts on
core issues related to the carrier's liability as prescribed in different unimodal transport rules. The courts have, for instance,
been divided over the interpretation of Article 17 of the CMR
and, in particular, over the type of liability provided in the CMR
rules (strict or fault-based),'" the scope of the "unavoidable circumstances" defense,' or the burden of proof established by
the CMR rules. 18 2 The courts have also been divided over the
scope of "willful misconduct" under both the CMR and the Warsaw Convention. 1 8 Thus, even after localizing cargo loss, damage or delay in delivery, and identifying the applicable regime,
the parties to the multimodal contract of carriage may still be in
an uncertain legal position because their situation ultimately depends on the jurisprudence of the court before which their case
is brought.
There is no doubt that applying uniform rules throughout a
multimodal journey would evade the uncertainties resulting
from the application of different unimodal transport conventions to the multimodal transport operation. Whether the uniform liability scheme could be successful in establishing clear
and certain rules, however, also depends on its terminology. Put
ISOCompare H.D. 24 June 1997 ND 1997, 167, (1998) EUR. TRANSP. L. 52 (Denmark-strict liability), with Hoyesterett [Supreme Court of Norway] ND 1998.226
(fault-based liability). See also HuGo TIBERG & JOHAN SCHELIN, ON MARITIME &
TRANSPORT LAw 150-51 (2012). In England, the road carrier's liability is seen as
strict contractual liability which is qualified by the defenses provided in the Rules.
See CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY ROAD: CMR, supra note 58, 1
54a; HILL & MESSENT, supra note 122, [1 6.2-6.6.
181 See Clarke, A Way with Words: Some Obstacles to Uniform Transport Law, supra
note 47, at 359-60 (citing cases that refer to the divergent construction of the
"unavoidable circumstances" (CMR, art. 17.2) by the national courts).
182 See, e.g., Robert Wijffels, Legal Interpretationsof CMR: the Continental Viewpoint
(1976) EUR. TRANSP. L. 208.
183 For the different interpretation of the "willful misconduct" in both the
CMR and the air conventions, see Clarke, The Transport Goods in Europe: Patterns
and Problems of Uniform Law, supra note 169, at 58-59; INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF
GOODS By ROAD: CMR, supra note 58, 11 101-103d. MALCOLM A. CLARKE, CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE By AIR 144-51 (2d ed. 2010).
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simply, the chances of avoiding ambiguities would be increased
if the text eschews using controversial terms from existing international transport rules that have resulted in litigation.'18 But
even so, it is likely that the new liability scheme would not be
free from legal uncertainty. There are no guarantees that it
would achieve an unfettered harmonization of laws in the sense
that the new convention would never accomplish unification of
the international multimodal transport laws.18 5 The reason is
that, because no single institution would oversee implementing
and interpreting the new instrument,' 86 there is a strong chance
that there would be differences in its implementation into national laws1 8' and the interpretation of its provisions by different
national courts.1 8 8
In sum, neither of the liability systems-the modified network
or the uniform-is perfect, as each has its own drawbacks. Nonetheless, between the two "evils", it is the uniform liability scheme
that enhances predictability of multimodal transport laws by
providing a seamless regime and promotes legal certainty, if
though combined with appropriate conflict-of-conventions provisions. But even then as the above analysis showed, such a combination still leaves room for ambiguity, though rather limited.
Moreover, there is no doubt that the success of a uniform liability system cannot be guaranteed, as it depends not only on the
successful drafting of provisions that would address the uncertainties of existing unimodal transport conventions, but also on
extrinsic factors, such as political bargains and compromises
that must be reached regarding the applicability of unimodal
transport conventions to multimodal transport operations.
184 See Clarke, The Transport Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniforn
Law, supra note 169, at 55-65 (discussing the diverse interpretations of core
terms of unimodal transport conventions and listing several examples).
185 See generally David L. Leebron, Claims for Harmonisation, A Theoretical Framework, 27 CAN. Bus. L. J. 64, 72 (1996).
186 For instance, the European Union (EU) can ensure the consistent implementation of aims set out in EU treaties by issuing regulations that have binding
effects on the member states. The EU can also secure the uniform interpretation
of EU law by the member states through the "preliminary ruling procedure,"
namely if a national court is in doubt about the interpretation or validity of an
EU law, it may-and sometimes must-ask the Court of justice of the European
Union for advice.
187 See, e.g., COGSA, supra note 90 (the implementation of the Hague Rules in
the United States).
188See Clarke, The Transport Goods in Europe: Patterns and Problems of Uniform
Law, supra note 169, at 55-65 (discussing perils of the sea, willful misconduct,
etc.).
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Is THE UNIFORM LIABILITY SCHEME COST-EFFECTIVE OR AT
LEAST MORE COST-EFFECTIVE?

The development of efficient transportation services and, in
turn, the promotion of international trade is inexorably tied to
the implementation of international transport rules, which aim
at reducing overall costs of transport operations. This objective
is achieved if, inter alia, transport laws eliminate or at least minimize friction costs burdening participants in transport operations, leading to a decrease in the price of products sold
worldwide. Hence, if one were to assess the cost-effectiveness of
multimodal transport laws, and in particular of the uniform liability system, the question to be asked is whether or not-and
also to what extent-the adoption of this type of liability system

would contribute to the reduction of unnecessary administrative
and other costs in order to promote the cost-effectiveness of a
new international multimodal transport regime.
The starting point is that a uniform liability system would be
seamless, transparent, and to some extent certain. It therefore
offers the prospect of reducing the mounting costs of pursuing
cargo claims under the current legal framework and, in particular, those costs associated with the complexities of the modallyoriented multimodal liability regime, e.g. the factual inquiries
over the localization of cargo loss and, as discussed above, at
least some of the pertinent legal inquiries.' But then, this is a
very simplistic approach. One must also look at the bigger picture and explore the impact of adopting a uniform liability

scheme on overall transportation costs and, specifically, on
cargo insurance premiums and freight rates.
With regard to cargo insurance, one would expect that the
predictability and legal certainty of a uniform scheme would
provide assurances to shippers about their prospects of recovery
against the MTO and thus lead to decreasing double or overlap
insurance friction costs.'9 0 Having said this, it does not mean
that cargo insurance would not be needed. Statistics show that
shippers tend to insure their cargo, especially if it will travel internationally, by including terms like "transit" (warehouse-towarehouse) 191 or "ex factory" clauses in their marine cargo poli189See the discussion on legal certainty, supra Part III.
190 See AsAliOIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 20; see also David M. Sassoon, Liability
for InternationalCarriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Some Comparisons,3 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 759, 771 (1971-1972) (with regard to the current position).
191 Institute Cargo Clauses (A) & (B) (1982) and (2009), Clause 8.1.
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cies.192 It cannot, however, be pre-estimated at this juncture
whether the amount of cargo insured would increase or decrease. The decision to insure or not would depend heavily on
not only on distance, but also on the terms of a new multimodal
transport convention and, in particular on the extent of the list
of the excepted perils and monetary limits (in relation to the
value of the carried goods). "

In addition, when it comes to the computation of the cargo
insurance premium, which is based, inter alia, on the sum of
claims paid by the insurer and on administrative costs of policy
and claims handling, one could estimate that adopting a uniform liability scheme would result in a decrease in the level of
premiums. This is because it is believed that shippers ultimately
pay higher sums simply because cargo claims handling involves
unnecessary legal and factual inquiries stemming from inadequacies of the (modified) network liability scheme. It is not possible, though, to calculate the exact, proportionate amount of
decrease because available statistics either refer to general
figures like overall administrative costs related to cargo insurance1 9 4 or overall friction costs related to uncertainties of the
existing legal framework incurred by all stakeholders.' 9 5
This is not, however, the only factor that may have an impact
on calculating cargo insurance premiums. For example, litigation may arise over interpreting novel terms in the uniform
rules, thereby leading to additional legal expenses to be incurred by the insurers. One should not automatically assume,
however, that cargo insurance premiums would increase based
only on this hypothesis. What should also be taken into account
See, e.g., Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft Int'l mbH v. Tai Ping Ins. Co. Ltd.
[1998] C.L.C. 851 (C.A.) (Eng.).
192

193 THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT OF CARRIER LIABILITY

ON INTERMODAL

FREIGHT

1 3.5 (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/library/final-report.pdf (where it was reported that one of the major reasons for
insuring goods was the low liability limits prescribed in the Hague regimes).
194 It is estimated that the shippers' administrative costs, which are mostly associated with cargo claims handling amount to approximately fifteen percent of the
cargo insurance premium paid. Things are worse for shippers without cargo insurance as the same expenses amount to twenty-five percent of the cargo premium they would have paid. Id. 4.3.
195 The Economic Impact of Carrier Liability on Intermodal Freight Transport
Report suggests that the overall administrative costs of claim handling under the
current framework amount to no more than twenty percent of the pertinent administrative costs. Specifically, in terms of multimodal transport in the EU, they
amount to 50 million euros per annum (based on a maximum total friction cost
of 600 million euros per year). Id. at 1 5.4.2 (but the report dates back to 2001).
TRANSPORT REPORT,
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is eliminating litigation costs related to construing provisions of
unimodal transport rules (unless the same terms are also
adopted in the new rules), which burden cargo insurers under
existing rules.19 6 Again, it would not be possible to pre-estimate
whether and to what extent there would be an increase or decrease because there is no readily available data on the pertinent
litigation expenses.
Furthermore, it is believed that there is a correlation between
the type of liability adopted in the transport rules and the number of cargo claims brought forward. Hence, it is likely that an
increased level of care would reduce losses and damage to
goods,' and would in turn lead to a decrease in sums of claims
paid and a proportionate reduction of cargo insurance premiums. The only caveat is that the terms of a uniform liability
scheme should impose on the MTO liability for cargo loss, damage, or delay in delivery that "will be sufficient to provide him
with a commercial inducement to undertake precautions, the
cost of which would be economically justified by the reduction
of the risk of loss or damage to the goods."' 98 Obviously, a different model would be economically unproductive and would defeat the purpose of establishing a cost-effective regime in the
first place. Although the level of liability is deemed to have a
significant impact with regard to unimodal transport, it may be
argued that its significance can be reduced in multimodal transport operations. This argument holds true only if the prescribed
level of care would be considered relevant solely to the conduct
and liability of the actual carrier, and thus only applicable to
transport legs operated by the MTO itself. Thus, it would be immaterial if the MTO is a freight forwarder or a "non-vessel-own196

See supra notes 180-183.

197 JoHAN SCHELIN,

CMR

LIABILTY IN A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE,

183,

availableat http://www.scandinavianlaw.se/pdf/46-8.pdf; see also ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONomics 336-37 (6th ed. 2012); RICHARD POSNER,
EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 226-31 (8th. ed. 2011); see also id. at 229 (stating that
strict liability will increase the number of claims in cases where damages are unavoidable in an economic sense, which is not usually the case in carriage). See also
generally Trine Lise Wilhelmsen, Transport Liability Regimes and Economic Efficiency
in LAW AND ECONOMics: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ERLINc EIDE 257 (Erik Rosxg et al.
eds. 2010).
198See Lord Diplock, Conventions and Morals-Limitation Clauses in International
Maritime Conventions, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM 525, 525-27(1970) (cited with approval

in Mitsui & Co. v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 807, 815 (2d Cir. 1981));
Michael F. Sturley, ChangingLiability Rules and Marine Insurance: ConflictingEmpirical Arguments About Hague, Visby and Hamburg in a Vacuum ofEmpiricalEvidence, 24
J. MAR. L. & COM. 119, 129 (1993); see generally POSNER, supTa note 197, at 214-15.

-
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ing ocean carrier" (NVOOC)-which is usually the casebecause under those circumstances the relevant level of care
would be that which is prescribed in the unimodal transport
conventions applicable to individual transport legs. It could be
argued, however, that the level of care provided in the multimodal transport rules would also have an impact on the MTO's
choice of subcontractors. The higher the liability under the multimodal rules, the more diligent the MTO will be in choosing its
subcontractors, leading to a possible decrease in the number of
claims.
In addition, one should also take into account the effect of
the type of the liability rules on the costs of legal adjudication of
cargo claims, which also plays a significant role in determining
the administrative cost of cargo handling and, in effect, cargo
insurance premiums. It is, for instance, well-established that litigation costs are lower in strict liability cases compared to disputes involving negligence.19 9 A reason for this is that cases
involving strict liability are easier to settle without going to
court.2 0 0 Moreover, even if a case is brought before a court, an
action engaging strict liability is evidentiarily less sophisticated
and thus less costly because there is no need to address the issue
of negligence. 20 1 Of course, this would not be as simple for multimodal cargo because the new multimodal transport regime
would most probably also provide for instances in which the carrier would be exculpated from liability. 20 2 The costs of administering the liability rules, and hence cargo premiums, would then
depend on the extent and complexity of the excepted perils in a
new multimodal transport regime. Compared to the network
and modified network liability schemes, however, the uniform
liability system would provide more certainty and simplicity regarding the basis for calculating administrative costs of cargo
handling. It would be based on only one liability system-either
strict or fault-based, possibly with excepted perils-and would

199

See POSNER, supra note 197, at 229.

Id.; see also CARKE, ISIC FINAL REPORT (2005), supra note 27, at 11.
See POSNER, supra note 197, at 229.
202 For example, "circumstances which the MTO could not avoid and the consequences of which he was unable to prevent." This was included in the draft
regime proposed in the ISIC. CAuRKE, ISIC FINAL REPORT (2005), supra note 27,
art. 8.4.
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not depend on the type of liability adopted in a unimodal treaty
applicable to the particular transport leg. 2 0 3
What would also play a role in calculating the final amount of
cargo insurance premiums is the proportion of claims paid to a
shipper by its cargo insurer, which is subrogated from the carrier's liability insurance. It is not, however, possible to pre-assess
the cargo insurer's prospects of recovery from the carrier or its
insurer under the new international multimodal transport instrument because the amount recoverable under subrogation
against the carrier's insurer would be restricted by the MTO's
defenses and monetary limits of the new multimodal transport
instrument. But even if limitation amounts were available, it
would not be possible to extrapolate their impact on cargo insurance premiums because there is no statistical data available
regarding subrogation rates from carrier insurance to cargo insurance, simply because insurance companies tend to be secretive on this matter.20 4
There is no doubt that all of the above factors would have an
effect on calculating cargo insurance premiums, which can be
assessed further only if and when the multimodal transport rules
are drafted. One should not, however, base one's assumptions
regarding potential increases or decreases of cargo premiums
solely on the impact of the above mentioned parameters. By doing so, one runs the risk of underestimating the significance of
extrinsic factors, such as market demand, which plays a major
role in calculating insurance premiums. 2 0 What that means in
practical terms is that market demand usually determines the
cost of premiums in the first place, and it is only at the next
stage of calculations that the remaining factors, e.g., type of liability, subrogation claims, etc., come into the equation regarding computation of a final premium, e.g., lead to an increase or
decrease.2 06
Evaluating next the effect of a uniform liability scheme on
freight charges involves, inter alia, assessing the impact of a new
liability scheme on liability insurance premiums. The starting
point is that implementing a uniform liability regime would not
203 Under the existing legal conventions, the liability of the carrier ranges from
fault-based (Hague regimes) to strict liability with exceptions (CMR and COTIFCIM 1999).
204 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CARRIER LIABILITY ON INTERMODAL FREIGHT
TRANSPORT REPORT, supra note 193, 1 4.6.
205 PETER ZWEIFEL & RONALD EISEN, INSURANCE EcoNoMIcs 6.2 (2012).
206 Id
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change the current position regarding the MTO's prospects of
obtaining insurance coverage for liability throughout all modes
of multimodal journey because the unpredictability and legal
uncertainty generated by the current legal framework do not
generally seem to be obstacles for the MTO in obtaining such
instance, a great number of mulinsurance coverage. 207 For in
timodal transport operations are insured by the TT Club, a mutual insurance company that specializes in insurance of
liabilities and equipment for multimodal operators.20 s The TT
Club offers tailor-made liability insurance policies to combined
transport operators, which generally extend to cover their legal
liabilities whether arising under contract, national law, or international convention.2 09 Where the uniform liability scheme may
have an impact, though, is on calculating liability insurance premiums, as it has been reported that uncertainty over the applicable legal rules leads to increases in liability insurance premiums
for multimodal transport operations to and from developing
countries and regions without clear legislation on multimodal
transport.210
Although adopting a uniform liability scheme would affect
calculating liability insurance premiums, it is not, however, possible to pre-estimate the exact percentage of the increase or decrease in premiums that would be associated with
implementation of a new liability scheme. Several factors could
contribute to this result. For example, much would depend on
the particulars of a new international multimodal transport instrument, such as the type of liability and terminology used in
the new rules, and the impact they may have on the number of
claims and litigation expenses.2 ' Moreover, there is no statistical data available on the amount of cargo claims or causes of the
cargo loss that would allow for accurate assumptions regarding
the impact of a new regime. Perhaps insurers find it uneconomical to collect such data or, even if they do, they are reluctant to
See, e.g., European Commission 2009 Report on Multimodal Transport,
supra note 27, at 115-16 (whereby thirty-four out of fifty-eight stakeholders responded positively to the relevant question); see also UNECE Report (July 3,
2000), supra note 42,
14.
208 See TT CLUB: MUTUAL INSURANCE LTD., http://www.ttclub.com/ (last visited
Nov. 21, 2012).
209 See id.
210 UNECE Report (July 3, 2000), supra note 42.
211 The risk theory of insurance revolves around the description and forecasting of liabilities resulting from the underwriting of risks. See alo ZWEIFEL & EISEN,
supra note 205, 1 6.1.
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publish it. Furthermore, the multimodal transport liability insurance model is based on the assessment of a wide range of elements, the body of multimodal transport laws being simply one
of them. 2 1 2 Bearing all this in mind, however, it would be helpful to address the instances in which the uniform liability system
could make a difference and in turn lead to an increase or decrease in insurance premiums.2 1 3
It is, for example, expected that there would be instances
where the enactment of a uniform system may burden the MTO
with friction costs, leading to a potential increase in freight
rates. Such cases would relate to an MTO's right of recovery
against subcontractors, which may in some cases be jeopardized
by the application of the uniform liability scheme. Put simply, as
it is not practically possible to dovetail the multimodal transport
regime with the various unimodal transport liability rules, there
would be cases in which the MTO would not be able to seek
redress against its subcontractors, either fully or in part. Much
would depend of course on the independent liability rules applying to the multimodal transport operation, but there may be
cases in which an MTO could not re-claim against its subcontractor because the latter would be entitled to rely on an excepted peril only provided for in unimodal transport rules that
apply to the MTO-subcontractor relationship. One could assume that this would occur, for instance, if a subcontractor sea
carrier relied on the navigational error or the seaworthiness defense as prescribed in the Hague regimes2 14 because one would
expect that a new multimodal transport regime would not include such anachronistic rules. An MTO could possibly find itself in a similar situation regarding monetary limits. Obviously, it
is not possible to foresee the financial implications for MTOs
without knowing the exact liability limits of a new multimodal
transport convention or other relevant details, like whether spe212 See also Ratko Zelenika, Tomaz Lotric, & Ervin Buan, Multimodal Transport
OperatorLiability Insurance Model, 23 TRAraic & TRAMsp. 25, 28-29 (2011) (referring to factors such as multimodal infrastructure and superstructure, multimodal
transport technologies, business policies of the MTO, MTO service quality, etc.).
213 It is worth noting that, unlike shippers, carriers would not be relieved of
legal and other administrative costs related to localization of cargo loss, as such
expenses would still remain relevant but only in connection to an MTO's recourse action against its subcontractors because they relate to identification of
the subcontractor to be sued and the applicable regime. Such costs would thus
still be reflected in freight rates and nothing will change in that respect.
214 Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, supra note 53, arts. IV., r.2(a), III, r.1 (nautical fault and seaworthiness).
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cial monetary limits would apply to multimodal journeys involving a sea leg, as is the case with the U.N. Multimodal Transport
Convention."' Also, there could be instances where the MTO
will lose the right to sue its subcontractor because the claim
would be time-barred.2 16 The end result in all of these instances
is that the MTO would either bear the costs of such losses itself
or buy extra insurance. Nevertheless, in both cases the freight
charges would be raised, shifting the ultimate cost of the "mismatch" between the multimodal transport regime and the
unimodal transport treaties to consumers.
Therefore, it has been proposed that the above difficulties
could be avoided if the same liability rules-the uniform multimodal transport rules-applied to both multimodal transport
and sub-contracted unimodal carriage, e.g., through express incorporation of new multimodal transport rules in pertinent subcontracts.2 1' This solution initially seems plausible, as applying
the same liability rules both horizontally and vertically would
solve issues arising from the "mismatch" of the multimodal and
the unimodal rules. It is not, however, viable for a number of
reasons. The first obstacle would be the CMR, which, under Article 41, Section 1, prohibits any derogation from its provisions.21
To this, one should add the possibility of adverse lobbying by
the transport industry and, in particular, the shipping industry,
which in the past has opposed increases in a sea carrier's liability. 219 Last but not least, depending on the monetary limit rules
in new multimodal transport rules, this solution may prove economically unproductive because freight rates related to a subcontractor's liability that exceed ordinary monetary limits would
be excessive. This assumption is based on the premise that it is
more economical for cargo interests to cover excess liability with
their cargo insurers than for carriers to insure against excess liaU.N. Multimodal Transport Convention, supra note 1, arts. 18 § 1, 18 § 3.
See Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, supra note 53, art. III, r.6; see also CMR,
supra note 16, art. 32, CMNI, supra note 73, art. 24; COTIF-CIM 1999, supra note
73, art. 48 (providing for only a one-year time bar, with the exception of wilful
misconduct-in the cases of the SMR and COMF-CIM 1999, where this period is
two years). Other transport conventions establish a longer period, such as two
years. See Montreal Convention, supranote 54, art. 35; Hamburg Rules, supra note
54, art 20; Warsaw Convention, supra note 54, art. 29.
217 ASARIOTIS ET AL., Supra note 27, at 30.
218 See also id. at 28 n.49, 30 n.53 (proposing solutions to overcome this hurdle
based on European law (restraint of trade)).
219 The shipping industry has objected both the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Transport Convention that increased the sea carrier's liability.
215
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bility. 2 2 0 This is actually why the option to declare higher value is
practically never exercised. 221 Thus, in cases where subcontractors agree to accept the higher liability prescribed in multimodal transport rules, it is inevitable that freight charges
applying to the multimodal transport contract would be significantly increased to reflect enhanced freight rates charged to
multimodal transports operator by subcontractors.
The analysis above showed that the cost-effectiveness of a uniform liability scheme depends on whether possible increases in
freight rates-mainly due to the possible loss of the MTO's right
of recovery against subcontractors-would outweigh potential
decreases in cargo insurance premiums attributed to reducing
litigation costs. It is not, however, possible to predict outcomes
at this stage for the reasons discussed above. What can, however,
be deduced is that one of the factors that would play an instrumental role is the scope of a uniform liability scheme's liability
rules, as they would determine its interrelationship with the diverse liability rules on unimodal transport claiming applicability
to separate legs of the multimodal transport operation and, in
turn, the MTO's prospects of recovery against its subcontractors.
It is inevitable, though, that there would still be cases in which
an MTO will not be able to recover from a subcontractor, as
discussed above. But their impact cannot be estimated-not
only because the particulars of a uniform liability are not set, but
also because there is no available data on the percentage of
losses attributable to particular causes, such as error in navigation. Thus, unless both unimodal and multimodal regimes are
aligned, which is unlikely to happen, such friction costs would
continue to exist, increasing the overall cost of products distributed throughout the world.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The quest for harmonizing international multimodal transport laws comes from the realization that the proliferation of
diverse rules adversely affects the efficiency of multimodal transport and the promotion of international trade. The longawaited harmonization has not yet been achieved, however, despite the efforts of several international organizations. Although
support has been expressed for reform of the current legal
220 Lord Diplock, supra note 198, at 529-30 (cited with approval in Smythgreyhound v. M/V Eurygenes, 666 F.2d 746, 752 (2d Cir. 1981)).
221 Lord Diplock, supra note 198, at 529.
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framework on international multimodal transport laws, it has
been established earlier in this article that any effort to that end
would be futile if it failed to address the shortcomings of the
current rules. In other words, a new international legal framework on multimodal transport will have genuine prospects of
gaining widespread acceptance only if it provides for rules that
are predictable, certain, cost-effective, and acceptable to the international transport community. It has been doubted, though,
as explained in this article, whether the network and modified
network systems of liability, as implemented in the current multimodal transport rules, meet those objectives because they create factual inquiries over identifying locus of cargo loss and
other related legal issues, which in turn increase friction costs
incurred by all stakeholders.
But then is a uniform liability scheme the way forward? This
may be plausible but much depends on the content of uniform
liability rules. In particular, the above analysis demonstrates that
although the predictability of liability rules should be intrinsic
to a uniform liability scheme, legal certainty will be only
achieved if successful conflict-of-conventions clauses are incorporated in rules to avoid clashes with existing or future
unimodal transport conventions. But even then, as the earlier
discussion has shown, the objective of legal certainty will not be
attained to the fullest extent because conflict clauses still leave
room for applying the unimodal transport conventions, leading
to legal ambiguities related to their application to multimodal
transport operations. The analysis then further demonstrated
that an increase in transaction costs-mainly those associated
with freight rates-could also be a major hindrance to the acceptance of a uniform liability scheme by the transport industry.
It is not, however, possible to estimate whether and to what extent there will ultimately be an increase for a variety of reasons
explained earlier in this article, such as the absence of empirical
data and information on particulars of the new rules, as well as
the impact of a wide range of factors on computing premiums.
But what the above analysis clearly shows is that the possibility of
increasing liability insurance premiums relates to MTO's risk of
losing its right of redress against subcontractors where its liabilities are not on back-to-back terms. Hence, much would depend
on the liability provisions embodied in the multimodal transport
convention and the extent to which they converge with or diverge from pertinent rules of the unimodal transport conventions, i.e. in terms of exoneration from liability and monetary
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limits. Ultimately, a cost-benefit analysis would determine
whether a uniform liability scheme in a new multimodal transport convention is cost-effective-or sufficiently cost effective to
satisfy the transport industry's needs and therefore gain wide
acceptance.
So, what lies ahead? The international community has not yet
embarked on drafting on an international regime on multimodal transport rules, despite the support expressed by the
transport industry and governments some time ago. A valid explanation may be that projects on multimodal transport were
stalled while the Rotterdam Rules were being negotiated,2 2 2 and
a wait-and-see position was subsequently adopted for implementing a new convention. It will be interesting to see how the EU
might proceed on that front, given that it has already prepared
three proposals for a regional regime on multimodal transport.2 23 It appears, however, that within the EU the general support is for an international regime, while those who support
harmonization at the European level only view a European instrument as a stepping stone toward the ideal of global uniformity. 2 24 What has also muddied the waters is that the European
Parliament has already urged its member states to adopt the
Rotterdam Rules, a limited multimodal transport regime, without delay.225 The situation thus remains uncertain and one cannot predict the EU's direction or any other multilateral body for
that matter. In any case, implementing a uniform liability
scheme in EU would represent a good test of its efficacy prior to
its adoption at the international level, given that the issue of
conflicts of conventions is far more pressing in Europe, where
most of the unimodal transport conventions claim
applicability. 226
222 For instance, the UNECE's project on the civil liability regime for multimodal transport was suspended while the Rotterdam Rules were prepared. See,
e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Inland Transport Comm., Report of
the Inland Transport Committee on the work of its sixty-seventh session (Feb.
15-17, 2005), 1 24, ECE/TRANS/162 (Mar. 8, 2005).
223 See supra note 27.

224 European Commission 2009 Report on Multimodal Transport, supra note
27, at 158.
225 See the Resolution of 5 May 2010 on Strategic Goals and Recommendations
for the E.U.'s Maritime Transport Policy Until 2018, Eur. Parl. Doc. A7-0114/
2010.
226 See supra note 138.
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